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Congress to act through sunset dates, penalties like sequestration, or other undesirable
policy outcomes. Alternatively, the legislative product itself may spontaneously update
without further action by Congress, a category I label “dynamic legislation.” For
instance, during consideration of recent tax legislation, lawmakers proposed that certain
tax cuts be automatically ratcheted down if the bill failed to generate sufficient economic
growth and that delayed tax increases not go into effect if revenue hurdles were met.
Of these various tools, I argue that dynamic legislation has the most potential to
combat legislative inertia while also meeting the challenges of the democratic process.
Specifically, dynamic legislation outperforms the other tools because it leverages the
resources of the administrative state without succumbing to excessive deference, it does
not impermissibly entrench the current majority, and it is not as susceptible to the
pathologies of the political economy and budget processes. Dynamic legislation also
provides a mechanism by which Congress can evaluate itself, automatically adjusting
laws depending on how well they are performing. Dynamic legislation holds
particular promise in areas, like fiscal policy, where these concerns are acute, and
where its design is not too costly.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Congress has lurched from one fiscal or budget crisis to
another. Expiring tax laws, government shutdowns, debt ceiling limits, and
sequesters have created an atmosphere of legislative chaos, requiring
congressional action to avoid dire consequences. On the precipice of each cliff,
real costs have ensued from the anticipation that Congress will fail to reach a
deal.1 Future crises seem inevitable, as the nation’s debt repeatedly approaches
the ceiling, clashes over annual spending levels increase, sequestration
continues to loom, and temporary tax policies once again take hold.2
Yet these events are of Congress’s own making, a direct and foreseeable
product of the legal mechanisms it has created. Why then does Congress keep
setting itself up for failure, creating games of chicken that have the potential

1 In 2011, for instance, a ratings agency downgraded American bonds for the first time, citing
the brinksmanship over fiscal policy as evidence that America’s political institutions have become
too dysfunctional to meet ongoing fiscal and economic challenges. STANDARD & POOR’S,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA LONG-TERM RATING LOWERED TO ‘AA+’ ON POLITICAL
RISKS AND RISING DEBT BURDEN; OUTLOOK NEGATIVE 3 (2011); see also Zachary A. Goldfarb,
S&P Downgrades U.S. Credit Rating for First Time, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2011),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/sandp-considering-first-downgrade-of-us-credit-rating/
2011/08/05/gIQAqKeIxI_story.html [https://perma.cc/JXS2-E547].
2 As of this writing, congressional leaders enacted a stopgap measure to fund the government
but only for a short period, ensuring another ﬁscal clash. Fourth Continuing Appropriations for
Fiscal Year 2018, Federal Register Printing Savings, Healthy Kids, Health-Related Taxes, and
Budgetary Eﬀects, Pub. L. No.115-120, 132 Stat. 28 (2018). On the tax side, Congress recently enacted
temporary tax cuts, many of which expire in 2025. Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat.
2054 (codiﬁed as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). This will likely set up another ﬁscal
cliﬀ similar to the one in 2012, which was created, in part, by the expiring Bush tax cuts. See David
Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 146 (2015).
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to end catastrophically?3 In designing these mechanisms, Congress recognizes
its limited capacity to respond to evolving circumstances. The legislative
process contains a status quo bias, making congressional response to changing
social, technological, environmental, economic, and foreign policy conditions
challenging. Other factors have combined with constitutional design to create
a system of government that, in the view of many, is hopelessly gridlocked.
To compensate for the status quo bias in lawmaking, lawmakers have
developed devices that aim to provide paths to legislative change, such as
prodding Congress into action by threatening policy cliﬀs or crises.
Although scholars have long addressed extracongressional means of
addressing this status quo bias, such as judicial expansion of the common law,
dynamic statutory interpretation, and agency delegation,4 only recently has
focus shifted to these congressional tools.5 Assuming it is possible to achieve,
locating the solution to legislative inertia within the lawmaking body itself, as
opposed to the judiciary or agencies, is preferable from the perspective of
institutional competence and separation of powers. Yet, as the legislative crises
3 See D ANIEL SHAVIRO, T AXES, SPENDING, AND THE U.S. G OVERNMENT’S M ARCH
TOWARDS BANKRUPTCY 121-22 (2006) (describing fiscal gap politics as involving, in game
theory terms, games of chicken).
4 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1985)
(proposing that courts sunset statutes to overcome legislative inertia); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 9-11 (1994) (theorizing about the judicial updating of laws
through the interpretation of statutes against a backdrop of changing contexts, norms, and public
values); Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2, 2-7 (2014)
(setting forth a descriptive and normative account of agencies as the primary updaters of statutes);
Jeffrey Shuren, The Modern Regulatory Administrative State: A Response to Changing Circumstances, 38
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 291, 292 (2001) (contending that the modern function of the regulatory state is
to allow a means for the federal government to respond to evolving circumstances).
5 In prior work, I have explored and critiqued several of these congressional tools, including
temporary legislation and the reconciliation process. Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (2011) (arguing for a presumption against temporary legislation,
especially in the context of tax legislation); Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2121, 2144-48 (2013) [hereinafter Kysar, Reconciling Congress] (critiquing
the reconciliation process as an agent for tax reform); Rebecca M. Kysar, Tax Law and the Eroding
Budget Process, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 61 (2018) [hereinafter Budget Process] (arguing
that subjecting the budget process to partisan wrangling challenged fundamental aspects of the
budget process itself); Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset
Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L. REV. 335, 338-39 (2006) [hereinafter Kysar, Sun Also Rises]
(arguing that sunset provisions “do not function as ‘good government’ tools in the tax legislative
arena”). For other notable works on temporary legislation, see Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary
Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247, 248-49 (2007), making a positive case for the use of sunsets,
and George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 193-94 (2009), defending temporary legislation as fostering political
accountability and fiscal restraint. In an important article, David Kamin discusses congressional
tools that overcome the less general (but related) problem of “policy drift” in the legislative
process. Like myself, Kamin supports the promise of dynamic legislation but for substantive
policy reasons largely apart from my own, which are grounded in democratic process. David
Kamin, Legislating for Good Times and Bad, 54 HARV. J. LEGIS. 149, 202-04 (2017).

2019]

Dynamic Legislation

813

of the past decade demonstrate, the tools that Congress most often employs
can have devastating effects. It thus seems wise to explore Congress’s entire
arsenal of anti-status quo devices, including those that are less often exercised.
The congressional anti-status quo devices can be divided into three main
categories.6 Procedural mechanisms—like the reconciliation process—may
eliminate barriers to legislating. I label these mechanisms “veto bridges” as
an antonym to the often used “veto gates,” which refer to those points in the
legislative process that can derail legislative proposals.7 Laws may also prompt
Congress to act through sunset dates or penalties like sequestration or other
undesirable policy outcomes. I identify this category as “prompting
legislation.” Finally, the legislative product itself may automatically update
without further action by Congress through the use of what I call “dynamic
legislation.”8 This type of legislation spontaneously adjusts legal rules to
future circumstances based on predetermined, external criteria.
I contend that it is this last category—dynamic legislation—that has the
most untapped potential from a democratic process perspective.9 Speciﬁcally,
6 This typology largely tracks and beneﬁts from David Kamin’s categorization for
congressional devices against policy drift. Kamin, supra note 5, at 171-82. There are, however,
diﬀerences between them, and I have departed from Kamin’s terminology in order to highlight these
diﬀerences and also to connect the categories with the legislative process literature.
7 See McNollgast, Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory Interpretation,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 11 (1994) (using the number of veto gates that need “passing” as
one factor impacting “degree of diﬃculty for changing a policy bargain”); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444-46 (2008) (naming
and describing nine such veto gates).
8 I use the term “dynamic legislation” to relate the concept to “dynamic statutory interpretation,”
William Eskridge’s famous theorizing of the interpretive process as a means through which the courts
and agencies assist in the adaptation of law to evolving circumstances, norms, and public values. See
ESKRIDGE, supra note 4, at 5-6 (“My initial and primary goal is to advance a thesis: that statutory
interpretation is dynamic . . . as a description of what courts and agencies do . . . .”). Dynamic
legislation also aims to achieve updating of policy, but does so through means intrinsic, rather than
extrinsic, to the law and Congress. Kamin refers to dynamic legislation as “automatic-adjustment
mechanisms.” Kamin, supra note 5, at 171 (describing an “automatic-adjustment mechanism” as one
that updates a legal framework for a “new set of conditions”).
9 Tax is an area that currently employs dynamic legislation; however, the full potential of
this device has not been realized even in that context. Some, for instance, have argued that the
tax code needs to take better account of inflation. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin & Eugene Steuerle,
Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in UNEASY COMPROMISE: PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID
INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 347 (Henry J. Aaron, Harvey Galper, and Joseph A. Pechman
eds., 1988); Michael C. Durst, Inflation and the Tax Code: Guidelines for Policymaking, 73 MINN. L.
REV. 1217, 1220 (1989) (arguing that the rejection of indexation “may reflect a failure to recognize
the full economic and political significance of inflation’s effects”); Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the
Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REV. 537, 538-39 (1993) (describing problems that may arise as a result of
failing to properly account for inflation). Tax brackets could also be adjusted annually to take into
account not only inflation, as is the case now, but also inequality and regional differences.
Leonard E. Burman et al., The Rising-Tide Tax System: Indexing (at Least Partially) for Changes
in Inequality 1-2 (June 5, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~shiller/behmacro/
2006-11/burman-rohaly-shiller.pdf [https://perma.cc/HA84-25RN]; see also David Albouy, The
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I argue that dynamic legislation outperforms the other anti-status quo devices
because it leverages the resources of the administrative state without
succumbing to excessive deference, does not impermissibly entrench the
current majority, and is not as susceptible to the pathologies of the political
economy and budget processes. Democratic considerations, in other words,
weigh in favor of dynamic legislation as a preferred tool against legislative
inertia. This Article thus builds the case that dynamic legislation has much to
oﬀer categorically. It therefore departs from the scant scholarship that exists
on the topic, which has traditionally judged dynamic legislation from the
standpoint of the particular policies at issue.10
From a practical perspective, each of the aforementioned tools have
limitations. Veto bridges are unenforceable and nonsubstantive in nature.
Prompting legislation disrupts planning by private and public actors.
Dynamic legislation is often costly to design, requiring information
upfront.11 The impact of these limitations is context specific, but dynamic
legislation holds the most potential in areas where quantitative indices can
be developed to minimize its design costs. It also will be desirable when the
area of law presents acute concerns in the democratic categories outlined
above—criteria in which dynamic legislation performs favorably.
Notably, ﬁscal policy shares all of these qualities. This partially explains
why this area already contains a greater degree of dynamic legislation than
other areas. Several features of the tax code, for instance, are indexed to
inﬂation.12 Recently, during consideration of the 2017 tax bill, lawmakers
proposed that the bill’s tax cuts be automatically ratcheted down if the bill

Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation, 117 J. POL. ECON. 635, 635-36 (2009) (“Indexing
the tax code to local costs would eliminate federal tax differences across cities that vary in
productivity but exacerbate them across cities that vary in quality of life.”); Louis Kaplow,
Regional Cost-of-Living Adjustments in Tax/Transfer Schemes, 51 TAX L. REV. 175, 177 (1996)
(analyzing the efficiency of tax adjustments based on regional differences); Michael S. Knoll &
Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes for Regional Living Costs and Amenities, 116
HARV. L. REV. 987, 989 (2003) (“[T]he failure to adjust individuals’ tax liabilities for different
regional living costs misallocates capital and labor throughout the economy . . . .”). I suggest
other possible reforms below. See infra notes 223–250 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, The More it Changes, the More it Stays the Same? Automatic Indexing
and Current Policy, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING 64, 85 (Frank Fagan & Saul Levmore eds.,
2017) (stating that one should judge dynamic legislation on the basis of the “meta-policy” at issue).
For sources exemplifying this approach, see sources cited supra, note 9.
11 See David Kamin, In Good Times and Bad: Designing Legislation that Responds to Fiscal
Uncertainty 22 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Policy at the Brookings Inst., Working Paper
No. 7 (2014)) (making a similar proposal in the Social Security context).
12 See Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707 (updating the tax rate tables and various credits
and deductions to take inflation into account).
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failed to generate suﬃcient economic growth,13 and that other tax increases
be turned oﬀ if a revenue hurdle was met.14
Other areas of fiscal policy also use dynamic legislation to some extent. For
instance, certain unemployment insurance benefits are keyed off a state’s overall
unemployment level. Some features of Social Security are indexed for inflation,
and Medicare premiums are tied to health care costs to an extent. Even still,
dynamic legislation is underutilized in these and other contexts. The design
features of dynamic legislation could be particularly useful in designing
Pigouvian taxes because they could be calibrated to the cost of current negative
externalities as they reveal themselves.15 Phase-ins and phase-outs that adjust
according to varying circumstances, rather than dates on the calendar, hold
promise, as do countercyclical and regionally targeted laws. Finally, laws could
be tied to one another or, like the 2017 tax proposals, to a budgetary goal.
Notably, many of these examples show that dynamic legislation also provides a
mechanism by which Congress can evaluate itself, automatically adjusting laws
depending on how well they are performing.
In Part I, I ﬁrst address the antecedent question of whether the current
level of status quo bias in lawmaking is desirable. In Part II, I lay out possible
tools that Congress can use to overcome the status quo bias—veto bridges,
prompting legislation, and dynamic legislation—and their eﬀectiveness at
achieving that goal. In Part III, I examine democratic considerations,
including those relating to interaction with the administrative state,
entrenchment, the political economy, and the budget process. Across all of
these categories, I argue that dynamic legislation outperforms the other tools.
Finally, in Part IV, I consider in what circumstances dynamic legislation
should be employed and oﬀer suggestions for its implementation.
I. IS THE STATUS QUO BIAS A PROBLEM?
Before addressing solutions to the status quo bias in American lawmaking,
one may rightfully ask if there even is a problem. After all, the Constitution’s
many hurdles to lawmaking are part of its contemplated design, intentionally

13 Jacob Pramuk, Senate GOP Rushes to Change Tax Bill as Setback Hits Hours Before Vote, CNBC
(Nov. 30, 2017), at https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/30/parliamentarian-says-revenue-trigger-in-goptax-plan-will-not-work-under-rules-of-senate.html [https://perma.cc/MY6Z-JRRV].
14 Jonathan Curry, Senate Republicans Contort Tax Bill to Fit Byrd Rule Box, TAX NOTES (Nov.
16, 2017), https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/senate-republicans-contort-tax-bill-fit-byrd-rule-box
[https://perma.cc/P59V-EL2B].
15 Pigouvian taxes are corrective taxes that cause parties to internalize the marginal social
costs of an activity that are not already included in the activity’s market costs (i.e. externalities).
Ideally, the taxes would be precisely set to these externalities. A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 192-96 (4th ed. 1932).
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balancing between policy stability and the whims of majority rule.16 Veto
gates like bicameralism and the executive veto collectively weigh heavily in
favor of maintaining the status quo.17
Yet much of today’s legislative stalemate can be attributed to dynamics
wholly apart from constitutional design. Supermajority rules, for instance,
are absent from the Constitution yet contribute signiﬁcantly to congressional
stalemate.18 Additionally, the committee system is an extraconstitutional
culprit of congressional gridlock, adding yet another combination of
decisionmakers who must reach consensus.19
Nonetheless, from a normative perspective, it might seem that the status
quo bias in lawmaking is not problematic. For instance, because we follow
majority rule, we should respect existing laws since they represent the
preferences of the majority.20 Stable law also encourages investment and
facilitates planning.21 There are, however, circumstances where we may wish
to depart from allegiance to the status quo.
The legislative process, at times, fails to reflect the preferences of lawmakers
and constituents. This breakdown is due to various phenomena such as cycling
problems, strategic behavior, and the inability to gauge the intensity of
legislative preferences.22 Condorcet’s paradox, for instance, illustrates that,

16 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 441-42 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999) (characterizing the separation of the executive from the legislature as “additional security
against the [enactment] of improper laws,” the threat of which overcomes “[t]he injury which may
possibly be done by defeating a few good laws”).
17 William Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31 J.L. E CON . & O RG . 756,
756-760 (2012).
18 Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1097,
1107-08 (detailing the rise of the filibuster and its contribution to gridlock).
19 Aaron Andrew-Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rule: Entrenchment, Separation of
Powers and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 355 (2003). Other extraconstitutional
hurdles stymy lawmaking, such as getting support from the Rules Committee to place the bill on
the legislative calendar. Id.
20 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 163 (1993).
21 This point was not lost on the Framers. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999). (“But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with
every rule of prudence and every prospect of success. The remark is veriﬁed in private life, and
becomes more just, as well as more important, in national transactions.”).
22 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1545-46 (1988); see also
KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 95 (2d ed. 1963) (“It was in this
context that Condorcet discovered that pairwise majority comparisons might lead to . . . an
indeterminacy in the social choice.”); JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
124-34 (1989) (describing the strategic behavior in the collective action problem); WILLIAM RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF CHOICE 137 (1982) (“[A]ny system of voting can be
manipulated to produce outcomes advantageous to the manipulators or at least diﬀerent from
outcomes in the absence of manipulation.”).
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under certain conditions, the order in which decisions are made, as opposed to
majority preferences, determines the outcome of majority voting.23
Collective action problems may also prevent legislators from voting for
their primary preferences if others defect from a common goal. For instance,
suppose each member of Congress prefers deﬁcit reduction. Constituents
may punish individual members if they vote to take away desirable but costly
beneﬁts unless other members also vote to do the same. It is thus in every
member’s interest to vote in favor of deﬁcit reduction. Still, individual
members may defect from that common goal if they suspect others of
potentially doing so. In this case, deﬁcit reduction is not achieved even
though it would reﬂect aggregate preferences.
Other phenomena may lead to laws remaining on the books even though they
diverge from current legislative preferences. Increased polarization in American
politics may create a bias for existing policies, rather than new, more preferable
ones, by impeding compromise deals.24 In this environment, politicians may
disagree only for the sake of disagreement so that they may differentiate
themselves from the other party, rather than because of policy preferences.25
Congress also has limited resources and time, which constrains its agenda.
Even though congressional preferences on many issues may have shifted,
Congress only has the ability to address a subset of these issues. Additionally,
each veto gate in the legislative process creates an opportunity for the policy
proposal to die without suﬃcient advocacy.
Interest group dynamics may also stymie the ability of the legislative process
to gauge preferences accurately. Public choice scholars describe the legislative
process as a marketplace of policies, with different types of legislation producing
varying levels of supply and demand.26 Interest groups are advantaged over the
diffuse public because of their greater ability to coordinate among themselves,
and they are generally more motivated. This increased motivation is a result of
their relatively small numbers resulting in a group’s membership experiencing a
greater proportion of harm and benefit as compared to the public. Interest
groups are an important factor in ensuring that the policy issue stays on the
congressional agenda at each veto gate. We should therefore expect a greater
23 Assuming that Congress would prefer Policy A over Policy B, Policy B over Policy C, and
Policy C over Policy A, majority rule results in no clear, stable outcome. Policy A will win if it faces
the victor of a vote between Policy B and Policy C. Policy C, however, will become law if Congress
ﬁrst chooses between Policy A and Policy B. See generally, ARROW, supra note 22, at 3.
24 Kamin, supra note 5, at 160.
25 Id. The work of Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal uses NOMINATE
scores to measure polarization in Congress and has shown a widening chasm between the two
political parties. NOLAN MCCARTY ET. AL., POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF IDEOLOGY
AND UNEQUAL RICHES 15-34 (2008).
26 See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON.
371, 373-74 (1983) (laying out how influence factors play out when looking at different homogenous groups).
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supply of private-regarding, as opposed to public-regarding legislation, even
though the public would prefer the latter.27
It may also be relevant to look at the degree of legislative stalemate to
conclude that current levels are unacceptable, since they are out of line with
historical norms. Political scientists have tried to quantify this trend. Sarah
Binder has measured Congressional productivity regarding legislation on
significant issues, concluding that congressional gridlock has basically doubled
since the 1940s.28 Three-quarters of these issues are now subject to gridlock,
according to Binder, whereas this number was as low as twenty-seven percent
in the postwar, Great Society Congress.29 Although measures of gridlock at
the time of the Founding have not been conducted, it is fair to say that gridlock
has dramatically increased in the past few decades.
All of this is not to say, of course, that the status quo should always be
overturned. Sometimes, existing law reﬂects the best policy, and there are
also costs to changing course. This discussion, however, aims to question the
argument that the current level of policy stasis in U.S. lawmaking is
preferable from either a normative or a constitutional perspective. Still, even
skeptics of the above analysis may support the use of congressional tools since
they do not require extracongressional interference with the lawmaking
process. Congress surely has the insight and power to cure ills it perceives of
itself. The remainder of this Article is devoted to analyzing the eﬃcacy of
those tools and their eﬀects upon the democratic process.
II. POTENTIAL TOOLS IN OVERCOMING THE STATUS QUO BIAS
In this Part, I will describe in detail the potential tools that Congress can
use to overcome the status quo bias in lawmaking—veto bridges, prompting
legislation, and, lastly, dynamic legislation.
A. Veto Bridges
As discussed above, the status quo bias in American lawmaking results
partially from Congress’s own internal procedures. Congress, however, has
also devised internal mechanisms that make lawmaking easier. These “veto
bridges” may reverse “veto gates” previously erected by Congress or may

27 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT & JAMES J.
BRUDNEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 47-48 (5th ed. 2014).
28 SARAH BINDER, POLARIZED WE GOVERN 10 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/BrookingsCEPM_Polarized_figReplacedTextRevTableRev.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4Q3J-GR6M].
29 Id.
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otherwise create shortcuts to lawmaking.30 Because veto bridges are
congressional procedures governing lawmaking, they are a subset of a
category of legislative rules. Article I vests “all legislative powers” in the
House and Senate,31 and under the Rulemaking Clause states that each body
“may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.”32 Aside from making their own
rules, each house has the power to unilaterally change or waive them, even
when such rules are enacted through statutes.33
Fast track processes are the most powerful of the veto bridges, establishing
streamlined procedures for considering legislation. There are examples of fast
track in a number of subject matters, including trade promotion authority,
unfunded mandates, nullification of agency regulations, and the closure of
military bases, among many others.34 Here, I largely examine one such process,
reconciliation, because its importance has risen in recent years.35
30 For discussions of congressional procedures reforming the lawmaking process, see generally
Aaron Andrew-Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto? Legalities, Practicalities, and Some Puzzles, 10 U. Pa.
J. Const. L. 447, 449 (2008) [hereinafter Andrew-Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto?], exploring
expedited rescissions, and Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, discussing fast track trade processes. Barbara
Sinclair’s work on “unorthodox lawmaking” is also relevant since these rules set up alternative
lawmaking procedures. See generally BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (2012) (recognizing the important phenomenon
of legislation that occurs outside the traditional path of lawmaking). Beth Garrett’s work on
framework laws also discusses many of these processes about lawmaking. See generally Elizabeth
Garrett, Conditions for Framework Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 294, 307-18 (Richard W. Bauman & Tvsi Kahana
eds., 2006). The budget process has also historically been an area of procedural innovation. See ALLEN
SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET 142-49 (3d ed 2007) (focusing on the budget reconciliation
process); CHARLES H. STEWART III, BUDGET REFORM POLITICS: THE DESIGN OF THE
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1865-1921 (1989) (detailing the
appropriations process); Allen Schick, A History of Reconciliation, 49 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 116 (1993);
Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws about Lawmaking in 2001, 17 J.L. & POL. 409
(2001) (discussing the legislative innovations that allowed for the passage of a controversial tax cut in
George W. Bush’s administration). Authors have also addressed the modern day realities of the
modern congressional process from the statutory interpretation perspective. See Lisa Bressman &
Abbe Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 911 (2013) (“A study of drafting ‘reality’ has
obvious significance for evaluating canons that are intended to reflect or affect Congress.”); Lisa
Bressman & Abbe Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 762 (2014) (“Our own research is
consistent with our respondent’s accounts of the increasingly unorthodox legislative process.”).
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
32 Id. at § 5.
33 For an exploration of expedited rescissions, see Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, and Andrew-Bruhl,
Return of the Line Item Veto?, supra note 30; see also Rebecca M. Kysar, Listening to Congress: Earmark Rules
and Statutory Interpretation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 519, 553-62 (2009).
34 See Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 346 n.9 (providing a detailed list of fast track statutes
and session laws).
35 Other procedural mechanisms allow for a streamlined lawmaking process. Under unanimous
consent agreements, amendments are restricted and debate is limited. CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20668, HOW MEASURES ARE BROUGHT TO THE HOUSE FLOOR: A
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Reconciliation allows bills to pass without being subject to filibusters or
nongermane amendments.36 Originally created by the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 (the “Budget Act”) as a modest means to reconcile the
first budget resolution with the now eliminated second resolution,
reconciliation has since evolved into a versatile tool to enact complex,
controversial budget-related legislation such as large tax cuts and health
care reform.37 Such legislation would not have passed without the
reconciliation process because it lacked supermajority support.38
Are veto bridges strong or weak devices in overcoming the status quo? In
one sense, they are extremely effective since they have the ability to tear down
strong veto gates that Congress has erected. They also help to coordinate
congressional action. On the other hand, because legislative rules are not
externally enforceable,39 their scope is often in flux. For instance, in 2001,
Senate Republicans successfully enacted some of the country’s largest tax cuts
in history through the reconciliation process.40 The Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) sunsetted the cuts so that they
did not violate the “Byrd rule,” which prohibits reconciliation legislation from
increasing deficits beyond the budget window period (a ten-year period, at the
time of enactment).41 This procedure was controversial at the time since many

BRIEF INTRODUCTION 5 (2012); VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-548, THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS ON THE SENATE FLOOR: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (2014). Under a closed
rule in the House, there can be no amendments to a bill on the ﬂoor, and in recent years, the House
has increasingly used such rules. See Michael Doran, The Closed Rule, 59 EMORY L.J. 1363, 1398-1400
(2010); Sabrina Siddiqui, House Republicans Adopted Record Number of Closed Rules in 2013,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.huﬃngtonpost.com/2014/01/06/congress-closedrules_n_4546762.html [https://perma.cc/L7V7-MRWD] (“Republicans adopted 19 closed rules
during the government shutdown in October, the most in a single week . . . .”).
36 See Congressional Budget Act of 1974 § 310(e)(2), Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 316
(“Debate in the Senate on any reconciliation bill or resolution reported under subsection (c), and all
amendments thereto and debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to
not more than 20 hours.”); Anita Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal Constitution: The
Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 590 (1998) (arguing that
reconciliation does not signiﬁcantly impel budgetary reform).
37 See Krishnakumar, supra note 36, at 590. (“In recent years particularly, reconciliation has
become the centerpiece of the congressional budget process . . . .”); Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra
note 5, at 2122-39 (tracing the evolution of the reconciliation process).
38 Because of the circumvention of the ﬁlibuster and the need to garner the votes of more
moderate Senators, however, reconciliation tends to produce more extreme, and hence less stable,
legislation. Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra note 5, at 2144-45.
39 The judiciary views the interpretation, application, and enforcement of legislative rules as
wholly within the congressional realm, unless fundamental rights or constitutional restraints are
concerned. Kysar, supra note 33, at 553-62.
40 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 370.
41 Fitting the tax cuts within the budget window was the original impetus for the sunsets; the
sunsets were shortened even further to lower revenue losses from the bill. See id., at 375-78.

2019]

Dynamic Legislation

821

saw reconciliation as a vehicle for deficit reduction.42 Reconciliation, however,
was again used for tax cuts in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 (JGTRRA), which were also sunsetted to reduce the bill’s revenue
losses.43 Collectively and commonly referred to as the “Bush tax cuts,” these
were two of the largest tax cuts in American history.44
Several years later when Democrats regained control of Congress, each
house imposed points of order against reconciliation bills that increased the
deﬁcit, essentially foreclosing the use of reconciliation for unpaid-for tax
cuts.45 The House then reversed itself again in 2011 when it changed hands to
the Republicans and lifted the prohibition against deﬁcit-increasing
reconciliation measures. It instead implemented a rule against using
reconciliation to increase net spending.46 In each instance, a simple majority
in each house decided the current scope of reconciliation, exposing its
boundaries as quite unstable.47 The general trend seems to be toward allowing
reconciliation in a wide variety of contexts, including passing health reform48
and, more recently, complex tax reform.49
The ﬂexibility of veto bridges is thus perhaps their greatest strength and
greatest challenge. On the one hand, veto bridges are powerful instruments
that are increasingly employed to overcome procedural hurdles. On the other
hand, the contestability over their ﬂuid boundaries makes their availability
unpredictable and, at times, their deployment contentious. Their endogeneity
also means they can be easily evaded and, as a constitutional matter, can be
changed by a simple majority in one house.
B. Prompting Legislation
Prompting laws are a category of laws that are designed to induce
Congress to act at a later date. Prompting legislation attempts to move
Congress towards a particular substantive result through the threat of
ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS, PROCESS, POLICY 142-49 (3d. ed. 2007).
Mark Abbott & Patrick Sullivan, Focus on Congress, 99 TAX NOTES 1357 (2003).
Jonathan Weisman & Naftali Bendavid, Obama Eyes $300 Billion Tax Cut, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 5, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123111279694652423.
45 H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. § 402-03 (2007); S. Con. Res. 21 § 203, 110th Cong. (submitted as
amended on May 8, 2007).
46 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. § 2(d)(1) (2011).
47 Each of these changes was made via the budget resolution, which is ﬁlibuster-proof.
48 Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
49 Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.). For an overview of some of the procedural tactics discussed by
Republicans to fit the tax legislation through reconciliation, see Kysar, Budget Process, supra note
5, at 61; see also David Kamin & Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws and the Budget Baseline, 157
TAX NOTES 125, 129 (2017), which discusses how Republicans could use a “current policy”
baseline approach to comply with the requirements of reconciliation.
42
43
44
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undesirable outcomes. Sequestration and temporary legislation are the two
primary subcategories of prompting legislation.
1. Sequestration
Sequestration is a process that is employed to reduce spending by
cancelling certain budgetary programs within speciﬁed parameters.
Sequestration places caps on programs and expenditures and removes any
excess above such caps.50 The sequestered funds can ratably come from all of
public spending or according to weighted formulas that advantage certain
types of spending over others.51
Congress first experimented with sequestration by adopting the
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act (GRH) in 1985.52 GRH was a response to
the massive deficit increases that followed the enactment of the 1974 Budget
Act.53 Specifically, GRH threatened to sequester spending that failed to
meet annual deficit targets by automatically imposing an expenditure
ceiling “across the board,” on both domestic and defense spending.54 In the
end, GRH failed to accomplish its goal of deficit reduction. Lawmakers
circumvented sequestration by engaging in budget gimmicks and shifting
the deficit targets.55
Eventually, lawmakers found GRH’s deficit targets and enforcement
mechanisms unworkable in light of a recession that began in 1990.56
Dissatisfied with GRH’s effectiveness, Congress turned to spending caps and
offset requirements in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA).57 The
BEA required that direct spending and revenue legislation be revenue neutral,
50 KAREN SPAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42050, BUDGET ‘SEQUESTRATION’ AND
SELECTED PROGRAM EXEMPTIONS AND SPECIAL RULES 2-3 (2012).
51 Christopher D. Dodge, Doomed to Repeat: Why Sequestration and the Budget Control Act of 2011
Are Unlikely to Solve Our Solvency Woes, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 837 (2012).
52 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deﬁcit Control Act of 1985 (BBEDCA), Title II of Pub.
L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 1069-70.
53 Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 595, 621 (1988).
54 Id. at 631; see also STANLEY E. COLLENDER, THE GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUDGET:
FISCAL 1993, at 21 (1992) (noting that certain federal programs, such as Social Security and tax
expenditures, were exempted from “across the board” sequestration).
55 Dodge, supra note 51, at 850-51; Christina S. Ho, Budgeting on Autopilot: Do Sequestration
and the Independent Payment Advisory Board Lock-In Status Quo Majority Advantage?, 50 TULSA
L. REV. 695, 718-19 (2015) (describing how Congress “contracted around” GRH using
“privileged reconciliation rules”).
56 See Alan J. Auerbach, Federal Budget Rules: The U.S. Experience, 15 SWED. ECON. POL’Y REV.
57, 61 (2008) (“[T]he combination of declining target deﬁcits and a recession that began in the
summer of 1990 led to a budget crisis when policies producing very large deﬁcit cuts would have
been required to stay on the prescribed deﬁcit path.”).
57 Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-575.
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and that any increases to the deficit be “paid for” through tax increases or
spending decreases (collectively, these rules are known as pay-as-you-go or
PAYGO rules).58 If, in total, such legislation increased the deficit during a
congressional session, sequestration would take effect.
The BEA rules expired in 2002, and they never triggered a sequester. As
the nation’s ﬁscal outlook improved in the late nineties, Congress found ways
to circumvent the sequester. For instance, in order to pay for the re-enactment
of certain temporary tax expenditures59, Congress repealed a revenue-losing
provision. Shortly thereafter, Congress reinstated that provision but without
an oﬀsetting revenue increase.60 Other evasion tactics, such as advance
appropriations, timing delays for government obligations, emergency
exceptions, and special directives allowed spending to escape the
consequences of the rules.61 Statutory PAYGO rules, enforced through the
threat of sequestration, were again reinstated in 2010.62 These rules have also
never resulted in sequestration.
The third phase of Congressional experimentation with sequestration
occurred with the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA).63 BCA directed
Congress to enact $1.2 trillion in spending cuts and to cut discretionary
programs by more than $1 trillion over a decade-long period. Sequestration
was the penalty for Congress failing to achieve these goals, resulting in $1.2
trillion of across-the-board cuts in domestic and defense spending.64
Congress failed to meet the initial deadline of January 15, 2012 to pass the
necessary spending cuts. Sequestration was thus triggered and scheduled to
take eﬀect at the beginning of January 2013 but was delayed by Congress until
COLLENDER, supra note 54, at 26.
Tax expenditures are deﬁned as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income or which provide
a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012). They are labeled “expenditures”
because they are economically equivalent to government spending. For a discussion of the
increasingly divergent treatment of tax expenditures in economics and the law, see Linda Sugin, The
Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax
Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 787-92 (2013). See also Linda Sugin, Invisible Taxpayers, 69 TAX
L. REV. 617, 645-46 (2016) (analyzing, in the taxpayer standing context, tax expenditures as tax law
rather than economically equivalent direct spending programs).
60 Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the Budget and Tax Legislative Process,
43 B.C. L. R EV. 863, 866 (2002).
61 C ONG. B UDGET O FFICE, T HE B UDGET AND E CONOMIC O UTLOOK: F ISCAL Y EARS
2004-2013, 114 (2003) (“To comply with the letter of the law while boosting discretionary
spending above the statutory limits, lawmakers used a number of approaches—including
advance appropriations, delays in making obligations and payments, emergency designations,
and specific directives.”).
62 Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8.
63 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
64 Dodge, supra note 51, at 837.
58
59
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it began in March of that year.65 Sequestration will continue until Congress
meets or repeals the deﬁcit reducing directives of the BCA.
2. Sunset Provisions
Sunset provisions, or laws that expire by their own terms without further
action by Congress, are another category of prompting legislation.
Temporary legislation has long been a part of American history. The Framers
advocated for the use of sunset provisions to overcome the stickiness of
legislation on both deliberative and democratic grounds.66 Congress’s
increasing use of it post-2000, especially in the tax area, has spurred recent
interest in the subject by legal scholars.67
Good government reform groups advocated for using comprehensive
sunset provisions to reduce the capture of agencies by interest groups in the
latter half of the twentieth century. Although their efforts never succeeded
at the federal level, thirty-five states enacted sunset review of agencies and
other governmental entities.68 This experiment by the states, however, was
widely considered a failure since periodic review was costly but ineffective
at dislodging interest groups.69
Congress has regularly employed sunset provisions for legislation.
Appropriations are made on an annual basis, and economic stimulus bills are
also sometimes sunsetted.70 In the 1990’s, an anti-assault weapons act and the
independent counsel statute enacted to investigate President Clinton’s
SPAR, supra note 50, at 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending the two-year restriction on
military appropriations); Letter from Thomas Jeﬀerson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 6 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904) (arguing for the sunset of all
laws, including the Constitution, after nineteen years).
67 See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 5; Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5; Jason Oh, Pivotal Politics
of Temporary Legislation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1055 (2015); Yin, supra note 5. The non-U.S. literature on
sunset provisions has also grown in recent years. See generally FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE
LIMITS OF GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION (2013) (suggesting
that legislatures pass temporary legislation to reduce opposition from constituents, test new
proposals, and delay decision-making to future legislatures); ANTONIOS KOUROUTAKIS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE OF SUNSET CLAUSES: AN HISTORICAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
(2016) (arguing that sunset provisions have long-standing historical roots and constitutional value
in terms of separation of powers); SOFIA RACHORDAS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND
EXPERIMENTAL LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2015) (arguing that sunset
provisions are valuable in light of uncertainty surrounding new policies); Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov,
Temporary Legislation, Better Regulation, and Experimentalist Governance: An Empirical Study, 12 REG.
& GOVERNANCE 192 (2018) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests temporary legislation is
becoming increasingly common and may be a useful tool for policy termination).
68 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 309-10 (1969).
69 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 354-55.
70 Kamin, supra note 11, at 23.
65
66
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transgressions both contained sunset provisions to win over opponents
concerned about the controversial nature of the bills.71 The antiterrorism
legislation known as the USA PATRIOT ACT also contained widespread
sunset provisions in the face of libertarian objections.72
In the tax context, Congress has re-enacted a package of temporary
provisions, known as extenders, every year since the 1970s. The biggest
extenders were made permanent in 2015, but several dozen remain.73 Many
of these provisions were originally sunsetted in order to review their
efficacy or to address transitory conditions,74 but Congress continued to
sunset them year after year chiefly because it would have been too costly to
make them permanent.75 As mentioned above, budget reasons were also the
motivation behind the sunset provisions in the Bush tax cuts.76 Most
recently, the 2017 tax bill sunsetted most of the provisions affecting
individuals in order to comply with budget rules and pressures.77
3. Prompting Legislation and the Status Quo Bias
The track record of prompting legislation in overcoming the status quo
bias is weak. The threat of sequestration under GRH proved too severe to
be effective and thus was abandoned. The statutory PAYGO rules resulted
only in congressional circumvention.78 The BCA sequester was intended to
serve as motivation to construct a deficit reduction deal but instead now
functions as the new status quo.79
Both GRH and BCA attempted to spur legislative action and failed in
doing so. Speciﬁcally, these acts sought to overcome negotiation breakdowns
and collective action diﬃculties to implement legislation that would eliminate
or reduce the deﬁcit. Blame could be placed on the unrealistic goals they
attempted to meet, but could these sequesters have been designed diﬀerently
such that a compromise plan could have been achieved?
Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 356-57.
Id. at 357.
JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 114TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF DIVISION Q
OF AMENDMENT #2 TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 2029 (2015).
74 Id. at 358.
75 David Kamin, Drawing the Line on Tax Extenders, HILL (Dec. 24, 2013),
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-budget/193904-drawing-the-line-on-tax-extenders
[https://perma.cc/7QMK-CV2Q].
76 See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
77 H.R. 1, 115th Cong. (2017).
78 See Auerbach, supra note 56, at 62 (arguing that the PAYGO rules enacted by Congress were
ineﬀective because Congress later evaded their requirements).
79 The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-67, 127 Stat. 1165, 1166 (2013). The
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 reduced the deﬁcit by $23 billion, but this can hardly be seen as the
grand compromise intended by BCA, which aimed to reduce the deﬁcit by $1.2 trillion.
71
72
73
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I would argue that sequesters fail unconditionally because of the near
impossibility of designing the proper amount of cuts. On the one hand,
sequestration has to be severe enough that lawmakers view the policy path of
avoiding the sequester as more favorable. On the other hand, if sequestration
is too severe, lawmakers will devise circumvention techniques or will simply
repeal the law.80 The experience with GRH and BEA suggests these laws
erred too far in the direction of severity and BCA’s threat was not severe
enough. It is hard at the outset to predict which side of the razor’s edge the
sequester amount will fall. For instance, contemporaneous scholarship
contended that the GRH sequesters might prove to be an insuﬃcient threat.81
Later, in the face of a recession, the sequester cuts were seen by lawmakers as
decidedly too harsh.82 Because of these design diﬃculties, the use of
sequesters to overcome the status quo bias will ultimately fail.
Sunset provisions have a mixed record of prompting action. In one sense,
Congress often acts at the sunset date. Congress has repeatedly revisited the
package of extenders to renew them year after year and continually renews
annual appropriations. It also moved to extend the Bush tax cuts and later
to permanently enact a portion of them.
Nonetheless, it is far from clear that sunset provisions do their job of
enhancing the deliberative process as envisioned by their advocates.83
Although Congress often acts at the sunset date, sunsets sometimes do little
but give lawmakers an opportunity to evade budget rules and to extract rents
from interest groups.84 In such cases, the renewals are similar in result to
Congressional inaction since they are moving Congress no closer to its policy
preferences. Perhaps more troubling is the arbitrariness of the sunset. Unlike
the sequester or dynamic legislation, sunset provisions prompt Congress to
act not when substantive goals have been met or when conditions have
changed but only at a certain date, often chosen due to budget process
pressures or the congressional calendar. As a result, sunset provisions are
overly broad, threatening cessation of still-favorable laws.85
Finally, as a categorical matter, prompting legislation, whether it be in
the form of sunsets or sequesters, often fails to overturn the status quo bias
because, by definition, Congress still has to act at the point of provocation.
80 See STEVE SHEFFRIN, MARKETS AND MAJORITIES 241-42 (1996) (citing alleged failures of
the political process in responding to severe sequestrations, in which legislatures circumvent the
original restriction rather than solve the underlying problem).
81 Raphael Thelwell, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Four Years Later: A Dangerous Illusion, 50
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 190, 196 (1990).
82 See Auerbach, supra note 56, at 61; Dodge, supra note 51, at 853-54 (describing the “delicate
balancing game” of setting the appropriate levels of annual deﬁcit caps).
83 Gersen, supra note 5, at 266; Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1041-46.
84 See infra notes 182–214 and accompanying text.
85 See CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 61-62 (criticizing sunset provisions on these grounds).
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Although the chances that Congress does indeed act may be increased due
to the unfavorable outcome it faces, a breakdown in negotiations, collective
action difficulties, a constrained agenda, or other dynamics that contributed
to the status quo bias initially may still be in place at that later time.
Congress may, therefore, end up with a poorer policy outcome than if the
prompting legislation did not exist.
Prompting legislation also poses practical problems. The uncertainty they
create disrupts the planning activities of public and private actors, increasing
compliance costs and distorting investment decisions. We saw these problems
acutely when parties were forced to plan around the sunsets of the Bush tax cuts.86
C. Dynamic Legislation
Dynamic legislation overcomes the status quo bias by adjusting policy
outcomes in accordance with certain criteria, without further action by
Congress.87 Dynamic legislation aims to conform law to evolving conditions
in order to maintain a previously agreed upon policy. It thus differs from
legislation that changes in response to arbitrary markers, like dates.
Legislation might, for instance, be phased in by the calendar,88 but this
86 An example illustrating the morbid humor of tax lawyers and economists involves the
estate tax repeal, which was in effect for only one year. Many began to refer to the sunsetted
law as the “Throw Momma from the Train Act of 2001,” after a well-known movie of that era.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Reckonings; Bad Heir Day, N.Y. T IMES (May 30, 2001),
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/05/30/opinion/reckonings-bad-heir-day.html (oﬀering up the name
because of the possible incentives that arrive from having a law that greatly changes the amount an
estate is taxed upon inheritance depending on when exactly the original owners passes away).
87 Dynamic legislation could be characterized as a type of unorthodox lawmaking, akin to those
types of legislation that do not follow "ordinary" frameworks and procedures. See SINCLAIR, supra
note 30; Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O'Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox
Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
88 Traditional phase-ins and “sunrise” legislation will present different dynamics. The
primary difference is that the lawmaking body, using those instruments, is able to impose the
consequences of lawmaking upon later generations without itself being affected, thereby presenting
democracy concerns. See Daniel E. Herz-Roiphe & David Singh Grewal, Make Me Democratic, But
Not Yet: Sunrise Lawmaking and Democratic Constitutionalism, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1975, 2003-04 (2015)
(relaying such concerns in the context of sunrise laws while also exploring the ability of such
mechanisms to function as democracy-enhancing veil of ignorance rules); see also Frank Fagan &
Saul Levmore, Legislative Sunrises: Transitions, Veiled Commitments, and Carbon Taxes, in THE
TIMING OF LAWMAKING, supra note 10, at 130, 143 (exploring the democratic deficiencies of
sunrise laws). Dynamic legislation generally takes effect immediately and thus does not present
these concerns as a categorical matter. The nontraditional phase-ins that I suggest in Part V are
contingent upon actual events transpiring rather than the mere passage of time. Accordingly, their
intent is not necessarily to delay imposition of costs and benefits so that they fall on a future
generation, and democratic concerns should thus not be nearly as acute in that context. Indeed,
Levmore generally carves out transition rules from the category of democratically suspect sunrise
laws since these exist to ensure efficient and effective implementation rather than to shift benefits
and/or burdens across generations. Id. at 140-41.
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legislation would not be dynamic under my categorical framework. This is
because it is not intended to preserve the policy bargain by adjusting to current
circumstances but instead exists to shift costs and benefits into the future.
It also should be noted that nearly all law contains some degree of dynamic
features. For instance, under the Controlled Substances Act, different
categories of drugs face different restrictions, and the DEA can petition for a
drug’s addition or removal based on whether it meets the standards outlined in
the statute—for instance, whether there is a currently accepted medical use for
the substance.89 Although application of this standard will change over time,
its dynamism arises primarily from an external body applying current facts to
the law, rather than from the law updating itself without congressional action.
It therefore would fall outside my definition of dynamic legislation.
Relatedly, we could also conjecture that dynamic legislation will be
more prevalent in the contexts of rules (as opposed to standards).
Standards are inherently dynamic because they generate different results
as circumstances change. For instance, the reasonable person standard of
care in negligence law evolves with social, economic, and technological
changes. Rules will be more likely to require a dynamic mechanism because
they do not have this built-in flexibility.90
One can press on the definition further, however, by asking what
precisely “updating” means. Here, I do not mean updating that results from
the application of a fixed concept to one’s particular circumstances but rather
due to evolving and external inputs, like macroeconomic aggregates. For
instance, the miscellaneous itemized deduction limitation in the tax code
allows certain deductions only to the extent they exceed two percent of the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. This is functionally equivalent to a rate
increase on top earners. Although the computed limitation is dynamic in
that it varies according to the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income, the
legislation itself is not updating in light of broader data—just the computed
dollar amount from the exercise of the taxpayer’s individual circumstances
at a given time. If the law made a rate increase to the top brackets contingent
upon the Gini coefficient (a common measure of income distribution)
exceeding a certain threshold, this would be an example of dynamic
legislation since the law itself is updating based on ensuing macroeconomic
data—i.e. the degree of income inequality at the time.
To the extent it has been employed, dynamic legislation has been very
successful at overcoming the status quo bias. Portions of the tax code, for
Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 811(a) & 812(b) (2012).
This would help explain why we see more dynamic legislation in those parts of the tax law
that are rules-based, e.g. brackets and the amounts of deductions and exemptions. Thanks to
Aaron-Andrew Bruhl for this point.
89
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instance, automatically adjust to take into account inflation. These
inflation-adjusted provisions include the rate brackets, the standard
deduction, the personal exemption, the earned income credit, and the
phase-out of itemized deductions and personal exemptions.91 Inflation
indexing of the tax code began in 1981 after a period of high inflation, which
moved taxpayers into higher brackets.92 Indexing became a way to protect
against this type of unlegislated tax increase.
Another prominent instance of indexing in the legal system is in the
entitlement area. Social Security monthly beneﬁts, as well as the annual
upper limit on wages subject to the Social Security tax, are both indexed for
inﬂation. Another aspect of computing these beneﬁts—the “average indexed
monthly earnings”—is indexed for societal wage growth during one’s career,
up until the age of 60.93 Medicare also contains automatic adjustments.
Medicare premiums for medical insurance and prescription drug insurance
generally must cover twenty-ﬁve percent of the cost of the program and thus
rise or fall with health care costs.94 Physician reimbursement in the Medicare
system also used to automatically adjust to a ﬁscally sustainable path in
accordance with a formula that took into account increases in doctors’ costs,
enrollment, and real gross domestic product per capita.95 Unemployment
insurance has a countercyclical feature built into it, which triggers additional
beneﬁts when a state’s unemployment level reaches a certain amount.96
Commodities are another area in which Congress has used automatic
provisions. In 2014, for instance, Congress enacted income support relief for
farmers, called the Price Loss Coverage and Agriculture Risk Coverage
programs.97 These federal subsidies assist farmers when crop prices fall below
a certain level, and the amount of beneﬁts paid varies inversely with the
average prices in a growing season. These programs are location-speciﬁc,
using the yields and prices of commodities in particular counties.98
91 Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 707. Inﬂation indexing is also used in the Aﬀordable Care
Act (ACA). The excess of premium growth over income growth is also a factor in calculating
thresholds in the individual mandate, thus taking into account increases in health care costs. See,
e.g., Rev. Proc. 2017-36, 2017-21 I.R.B. 1251 (calculating indexing adjustments for ACA provisions).
92 Stephen J. Entin, Tax Indexing Turns 30, TAX FOUND. (March 11, 2015),
https://taxfoundation.org/tax-indexing-turns-30 [https://perma.cc/T73X-HFYE].
93 DANIEL SHAVIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 13 (2000).
94 See, e.g., Kamin, supra note 11, at 35 (“Medicare has a signiﬁcant automatic-adjustment
trigger that raises or lowers premiums depending on the trajectory of health costs . . . .”).
95 Id. at 34. Kamin also notes that Congress has overridden these limitations more often than
not. Id. This method was repealed by the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015.
Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129 Stat. 87, 89.
96 See Kamin, supra note 5, at 171-72 (discussing the “automatic-adjustment mechanisms” of the
federal unemployment insurance system).
97 Agricultural Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-79, 128 Stat. 649 §§ 1116 & 1117.
98 Id.
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The challenge of dynamic legislation is the up front costs in its design.99
In order to devise successful dynamic legislation, Congress needs to study
various conditions that might activate the subsequent policy change and how
policy should respond to such conditions. There are, however, ways to
ameliorate the design diﬃculties inherent in dynamic legislation through, for
instance, the use of indexing. Indeed, we would expect dynamic legislation to
be least costly to design when the conditions to which it is responding are
easily quantiﬁable. I take up the question of design in more detail in my
discussion of implementing dynamic legislation below.100
One might ask however, if, in addition to posing design costs, dynamic
legislation might also be more difficult to enact in the first place. The
legislature must decide how future circumstances affect current policy, and
it may be difficult to form a coalition behind this task.101 Leaving the course
of the law unenumerated may be the only way to gain the requisite votes.
In order to enact prompting legislation, on the other hand, Congress need
only come to an agreement on what the law should not be.102
Although this is a valid point, it is not necessarily the case. Instead, it
might be that setting the course of legislation to sail on a particular course
will garner increased support for the policy at issue. If there is consensus
behind a policy, it is diﬃcult to see why that policy preference should not be
protected against ﬂuctuating circumstances. Suppose, for instance, that a
representative supports the current tax rate structure in part because it is
favorable to his base—low and middle-income constituents. Inﬂation
indexing that rate structure helps to ensure that current law continues that
distribution of the tax burden by giving it the advantage of legislative inertia.
Lawmakers might also favor dynamic legislation since it will adjust
expectations in favor of the current policy. Rather than allowing changing
conditions to steadily erode the law, dynamic legislation helps to bake
expectations regarding anticipated benefits into the policy baseline. For
instance, since social security benefits are currently indexed for inflation and for
wage growth, slowing the rate of these increases to Social Security benefits is
framed as a cut to the entitlement.103 This framing helps lawmakers who are in
favor of entitlement protection. Overall it is difficult to conclude that dynamic

99 See Kamin, supra note 11, at 22 & 25 (discussing the intensive information gathering and
decisionmaking required of policymakers at the outset of both setting up triggers generally and
of indexing specifically).
100 See infra notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
101 Shaviro, supra note 10, at 67-68.
102 See David Kamin, Legislating Crisis, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING, supra note 10, at 34, 41
(making a similar point in the context of formulating default rules for crises).
103 Shaviro, supra note 10, at 68.
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legislation is inherently more controversial to enact than ordinary legislation and
may, in some instances, facilitate agreement among lawmakers.
It should also be noted that dynamic legislation cannot solve gridlock in
every instance, and its success in overcoming the status quo bias may depend
on the source of gridlock. For instance, if Congress cares about controlling
policy but has little information about the future, it may choose to overcome
the status quo bias through sunsets or other prompting legislation. If
Congress wishes to control policy but has more information about the future,
dynamic legislation will be a viable option. If Congress, on the other hand,
wishes to relinquish control over policy, delegation to agencies (a
noncongressional anti-status quo device discussed below104) will be more
likely. We can summarize the conditions in Table 1.
Table 1: Conditions for Selection of Anti-Status Quo Devices

Congress cares about
controlling policy
Congress does not care
about controlling policy

Congress has little
information about
the future
sunsetting or other
prompting legislation
delegation to agency

Congress has more
information about
the future
dynamic legislation
no clear prediction

We might then ask what is the point in comparing the various devices if
they accomplish diﬀerent goals. Part of this project, however, argues that
Congress uses prompting legislation too often, even when it has
information.105 In that case, dynamic legislation might be a better option
given its democratic advantages, and we might consider deploying the use of
prompting legislation in narrower contexts, for instance conﬁning temporary
legislation to experimentation and emergencies.
III. DEMOCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS
The anti-status quo devices have democratic consequences because they
impact the agenda of future congresses, interest group activity, the budget
process, and the ability of Congress to control delegation to the executive
branch. This part explores these dynamics.
See infra notes 106, 117, & 119 and accompanying text.
For instance, in the recent 2017 tax legislation, Congress sunsetted many portions of the act
in order to ﬁt the bill through the budgetary constraints of reconciliation, not because it lacked
information to continue the desired policies.
104
105
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A. Interaction with the Administrative State
Delegation to the administrative state is another way in which Congress
overcomes the inertia bias in lawmaking106 and is perhaps the most examined
anti-status quo device in the literature.107 Congress delegates gap-filling
authority to agencies, which, in turn, update the body of rules over time. Straight
delegation to agencies remains necessary when Congress cannot foresee
problems that need to be addressed. But if Congress can predict such issues, or
at least their outlines to a sufficient degree to guide the agency, the question
thus becomes which of the aforementioned congressional tools can best leverage
the resources of the administrative state while also minimizing its costs. Here, I
contend that dynamic legislation has clear advantages over temporary
legislation, which is also used to minimize agency delegation.108
A primary cost of delegation to agencies is, of course, congressional
relinquishment of substantial lawmaking authority to the executive
branch.109 This shift of power poses constitutional concerns.110 It also creates
legal and practical dilemmas as Congress attempts to offset this transfer of
power through oversight hearings, the power of the purse, the creation of
independent agencies, enhanced judicial review, and statutory reversal of
agency action, among others.111 These mechanisms, however, only go so far
in restoring congressional preferences over policy. They also may
considerably delay the administrative process.
These considerations are even more acute as the executive power has
expanded in recent years.112 Why, though, does Congress reallocate its
authority to the executive branch in the ﬁrst place? One answer might be that
Congress delegates broadly in times of policy agreement with the President.
Many such delegations were enacted in the New Deal and Great Society eras,
when congressional preferences converged with those of the President.113 The
delegating statutes remain in eﬀect, however, long after those preferences

William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L. J. 523, 533 (1992).
See, e.g., id. (“[I]n the modern administrative state most ‘lawmaking’ is accomplished by
agencies under the authority of statutory delegations.”).
108 Here, I primarily compare dynamic legislation with temporary legislation, since sequesters
and veto bridges are not used to minimize agency delegations.
109 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 533.
110 See, e.g., id. at 534-39 (discussing the nondelegation doctrine and outlining possible impacts
of the shift of power).
111 Id. at 539-40 (examining these compensatory mechanisms and evaluating some of their
problems and impacts).
112 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obamabypass-congress.html.
113 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 539.
106
107
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diverge.114 As these delegations accumulate, Congress ﬁnds itself ceding more
and more authority to the President.
Pages and pages of scholarly work have been written to justify the rise of
the regulatory state, including as a response to the complexity of the modern
world, the relative expertise of the regulatory agencies, and the limited
ability of Congress to act quickly to changing circumstances and
information.115 Although these reasons may justify each individual
delegation, when viewing the delegations in their entirety, we see a system
that bestows upon the President a great deal of control.116 The risk of this
choice is that the constitutional separation of powers no longer adequately
safeguards against an overreaching President. Moreover, with the near
demise of the nondelegation doctrine, the judicial branch is unlikely to
prevent the ceding of too much legislative authority.117 Indeed, under
Chevron deference, the judiciary may exacerbate the problem.118 It is instead
up to Congress to police its legislative domain.
Although repealing previous authorizations is unrealistic, Congress may
wish to narrow future rulemaking discretion. The challenge for Congress is to
retain its lawmaking jurisdiction while also crafting a legal apparatus that
remains current. One statutory-based solution to this dilemma is to attach a
sunset provision to a delegating statute.119 That way, the statute will not remain
on the books long after congressional and executive preferences have deviated
from one another. It will, however, be difficult for Congress to set the
appropriate sunset length. At the outset, Congress will not be able to predict
when that divergence will take place. Congress also has to act again in order to
effectuate its continued preferences. Assuming Congress prefers continuation
of the sunsetted policy more than reversion to the underlying permanent policy,
as may often be the case,120 Congress will spend its limited time and resources
on revisiting policy simply to keep the other branch in check.
Id.
See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR
(1981); DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWER (1999); JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938): JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND
GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); Jerry L. Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
116 Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 534.
117 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canon, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000) (“It is often
said that the nondelegation doctrine is dead.”).
118 See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 511-26 (1989) (criticizing Chevron deference as worsening the
delegation problem by empowering the President, rather than Congress, as the “control center of
domestic public policy making”).
119 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 726-28 (2012) (exploring
how sunset provisions can maintain separation of powers by “reset[ting] the legislative baseline”).
120 See infra notes 155–163 and accompanying text.
114
115
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Dynamic legislation would be a better solution to this institutional
dilemma because it would cabin executive discretion while also allowing
that discretion to evolve in light of changing circumstances.121 It would do
so without necessarily slowing down the administrative process. For
instance, Congress delegated to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) the power to regulate “any air pollutant[s] . . . which may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”122 The EPA’s
implementation of this statute has been notoriously political, particularly
with regard to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases implicated in
climate change. One way to cabin the EPA’s regulatory (and deregulatory)
power would be to delegate findings of certain current external indicia, like
carbon consumption, atmospheric conditions, temperature changes, sea
levels, and other carbon reduction efforts by developing nations. These
findings could then be compiled to form an index, which, in turn, could
automatically increase or decrease certain statutory requirements.123
Dynamic legislation may also be a way to delegate in areas where
Congress has traditionally been reluctant to do so. Jim Hines and Kyle
Logue, for instance, have noted that the Department of the Treasury has
little authority over substantive policy compared with other agencies and
have criticized Congress’s unwillingness to delegate in the tax area.124 They
thus suggest, among other ideas, that Congress should delegate the power
to set tax rates in order to leverage agency expertise and nimbleness.125
Their proposal is interesting, but it implicates important questions about
whether Congress should delegate its power to tax given its unique
constitutional role over taxation and the desirability of locating decisions
over tax policy to a more accountable body.126
We need not make conclusions as to the precise degree of desirable
delegation. For our purposes, I explore this scenario only to point out that
dynamic legislation gives Congress the option to ratchet delegation up or down,

121 David Kamin makes a similar point but with regard to using automatic triggers that turn
policy on and oﬀ, in conjunction with delegation. Kamin, supra note 11, at 29.
122 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012).
123 Richard Lazarus has put forth a comparable proposal. Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1228 (2009).
124 James R. Hines Jr. & Kyle D. Logue, Delegating Tax, 114 MICH. L. REV. 235, 253 (2015). For
a discussion of the strategic considerations that cause the executive branch to not heavily regulate in
the tax area, see Daniel J. Hemel, The President’s Power to Tax, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 633 (2017).
125 Hines and Logue, supra note 124.
126 Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and the House of Representatives
specifically the power to originate revenue bills. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 7-8. For background on the
Origination Clause and Congress’s special constitutional role over tax policy, see generally Rebecca M.
Kysar, The ‘Shell Bill’ Game: Avoidance and the Origination Clause, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 659 (2014), and
Rebecca M. Kysar, On the Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2013).
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if it so desires. In the tax context, for instance, Congress might design a law that
affords some rate-setting discretion to the Treasury, Federal Reserve, or other
body, but cabins that discretion through formulas or indices.127 In times of sharp
unemployment rises or decreases, the rate-setting body could reduce or increase
taxes, but only by a correlating percentage within a specified range.
One important strategic advantage that dynamic legislation would have
over straight agency delegation is its staying power. Congressional members
may appreciate that policies set by dynamic legislation would not be subject
to the whims of the current President. The stability that dynamic legislation
provides would also be beneﬁcial from a private planning perspective. Rather
than question if federal policy will continue after a presidential transition,
those aﬀected by the policy would have more assurance in the government’s
commitment to that policy.
B. Entrenchment Concerns
Due to the fact that anti-status quo devices impose consequences on later
congresses, it becomes relevant to question whether they impermissibly entrench
those subsequent bodies. Under democratic and constitutional principles, current
governments cannot bind future governments.128 As a manifestation of this
principle, governments must be able to repeal the laws of their predecessors so
that each government can remain reactive to the preferences of its current
constituents.129 The entrenchment principle “implicates the very reach of
government power and the nature of democratic accountability.”130 Frustratingly,
however, the parameters of entrenchment are ill-defined.
In an attempt to formalize the concept, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule
have deﬁned entrenchment in its “de jure” sense as “the enactment of either
statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding against subsequent
127 Hines and Logue themselves mention such a possibility—not as a response to these
concerns, but as part of the new system’s design. They dismiss it for not aﬀording enough discretion
to the rate-setting body. Hines & Logue, supra note 124, at 263-64.
128 See John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773 (2003); see also Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits
on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381-82,
391-93 (1987) (tracing objections to legislative entrenchment to “the temporal nature of the
legislature’s mandate from the citizenry” and American rejection of legislative supremacy); John O.
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory,
89 VA. L. REV. 385, 444 (2003) (objecting to entrenchments but not sunset provisions).
129 See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011); see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1665 (2002) (“When cashed out in
terms of constitutional doctrine, the principle means that legislatures may not enact . . . statutes
or rules that bind the exercise of legislative power, by a subsequent legislature, over the subject
matter of the entrenching provision.”).
130 Serkin, supra note 129, at 881.
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legislative action in the same form.”131 Under this deﬁnition, none of the antistatus quo devices discussed here entrench. Indeed, no legislative devices
would truly entrench Congress (only the Constitution would, by requiring
supermajorities for its amendment).132
But if we expand the notion of entrenchment to include those acts that
are not simply legally binding upon subsequent legislatures, as Posner and
Vermeule use the term, but also those acts that functionally bind such
legislatures, then entrenchment issues become more concerning. These
occurrences are entrenchment in its “de facto” sense.133 It is important to note
that de facto entrenchment will also capture permissible acts—indeed, it
primarily captures such acts. Many actions taken by a current government,
after all, will aﬀect the decisions and decision-making capacity of future
governments. For instance, all statutes are harder to repeal because of the
status quo bias, yet they do not all impermissibly entrench.134
1. Veto Bridges and Entrenchment
The entrenchment qualities of veto bridges are complex. As legislative
rules, each house has purview over them as a matter of constitutional law, and
this is most likely the case even when enacted in statutory form.135 The House
adopts a new set of rules, which is passed by a simple majority, at the start of
each Congress.136 The Senate’s rules, by contrast, exist in perpetuity and
contain the restriction that they only be changed by a two-thirds
supermajority in Rule XXII.137 The supermajority requirement thus is
sometimes said to entrench the Senate’s rules.
The continuing body theory of the Senate, which is based on the fact that
two-thirds of the Senate body continues from one term to the next, is invoked
to justify this type of entrenchment since there is no future Senate to bind.138
131 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1667; see also Adrian Vermeule, Superstatues, NEW REPUBLIC
(Oct. 26, 2010), https://newrepublic.com/article/78604/superstatutes [https://perma.cc/WJ4P-6AN9]
(introducing and explaining a distinction between “de jure” and “de facto” entrenchment).
132 See Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 374 (“In our system, entrenched legislation is a rare
creature, for it is almost universally regarded as impermissible.”). But see Posner & Vermeule,
supra note 129, at 1673-93 (arguing against this view).
133 Vermeule, supra note 131.
134 Id. The decision to spend government funds now also denies later generations the
opportunity to do so. Yet this would also not be considered impermissible.
135 For a thorough analysis of Congress’s power over its rules vis-à-vis the other branches, see
Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 359-70.
136 JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30725, THE FIRST DAY OF A NEW
CONGRESS: A GUIDE TO PROCEEDINGS ON THE HOUSE FLOOR 9-10 (2017).
137 Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 113-18 (2013), R. XXII at 15.
138 Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the ‘Continuing Body’ Theory of the Senate, 95 I OWA L.
R EV. 1401, 1444-56 (2010).
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Aaron Bruhl has argued, however, that the continuing body theory does not
reflect the institutional reality of the Senate and that it is insufficient to justify
the binding of the Senate against itself.139 Recent Senate practice supports
Bruhl’s views. In 2011, the Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev) used
the “nuclear option” to prevent Republicans from forcing votes on amendments
after a bill was moved to final passage.140 In 2013, a simple majority, again under
the leadership of Reid, invoked the nuclear option to end filibusters on
executive branch nominees and judicial nominees other than to the Supreme
Court.141 Republicans extended this precedent to Supreme Court nominees
during the confirmation hearings of Justice Gorsuch in 2017.142
Entrenchment with regard to legislative rules thus presents a mixed
picture. There seems to be some support for the belief that Senate rules are
entrenched, although in recent years, the fragility of the ﬁlibuster, as made
evident in the changing boundaries of reconciliation143 and the executive
appointment contexts, calls into question this view. Moreover, because each
house can change legislative rules and because the rules generally are outside
of judicial enforcement, the current legislative body maintains a great deal of
liberty over their content.
2. Prompting Legislation and Entrenchment
Both main types of prompting legislation cause de facto entrenchment
issues. This is because sequestration and sunsets require legislative action
just to avoid the imposition of unfavorable policies. They thus have the
potential to crowd out Congressional action on other policy choices. GRH
was initially criticized as illegitimately entrenching the preferences of the
enacting Congress.144 Paul Kahn argued that the Act contained an implicit
restriction that any repeal be expressly stated. 145 This is a somewhat
Id. at 1408.
Alexander Bolton, Reid Triggers ‘Nuclear Option’ to Change Senate Rules, End Repeat Filibusters,
HILL (Oct. 7, 2011), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/186133-reid-triggers-nuclear-option-tochange-senate-rules-and-prohibit-post-cloture-ﬁlibusters [https://perma.cc/U5BT-465Z].
141 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html
(“Under the change, the Senate will be able to cut off debate on executive and judicial branch
nominees with a simple majority rather than rounding up a supermajority of 60 votes . . . . .”).
142 Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-court-senate.html.
143 See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
144 See Paul Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the Capacity of Congress to Control the Future, 13
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 187-88 (1986) (“The kind of control of the legislative function that
Gramm-Rudman intends can only be accomplished constitutionally through the amendment
process, not by statute.”).
145 Id. at 202 n.61.
139
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implausible reading of the statute. To the contrary, sequestration, as
illustrated by the many examples of Congress evading its consequences
over the years, does not legally entrench. As Posner and Vermeule have
written, the “brute fact, one that Kahn cannot quite get around, is that
Gramm-Rudman did not entrench itself. A simple majority vote of any
later Congress sufficed to raise the deficit caps or repeal them pro tanto,
and in fact Congress has done just that on several occasions.”146 From a
present-day perspective, sequestration is criticized for its inability to bind
future congresses.147
Kahn also argued that GRH violated de facto entrenchment in other ways.
First, the substance of Congress’s future legislative decisions would be altered
because of the command to examine them in light of the deficit. Second, “by
changing the effect of legislative inertia,” GRH modified the course of
legislative judgment since repeal can be blocked by a minority.148 But Posner
and Vermeule are correct to say that these arguments can be lodged against all
statutes.149 Kahn’s objection is based on the fact that GRH changed the status
quo. Existing legislation, however, usually has some effect upon how current
issues are framed, and it always must be repealed by an affirmative act.
Another, more valid, entrenchment argument, however, could be made
against the sequestration device. What Kahn, Posner, and Vermeule
overlook is the burden of action that sequestration places upon Congress in
order to avoid the occurrence of sequestration. It is not the fact that GRH
altered the substance of Congress’s decisionmaking or that Congress had to
mobilize to repeal it (which it, in fact, did). It is the affirmative actions that
Congress must undertake to avoid sequestration, which burden its already
crowded legislative agenda.
By deﬁnition, sequestration is an undesirable outcome. It thus diﬀers
from ordinary legislation in that the status quo is less likely to reﬂect the
current majority’s preferences (and therefore it is more entrenching). Under
GRH and BCA, Congress had to either meet certain goals through deﬁcitreducing legislation, engage in budgeting gimmicks, or repeal the legislation
in order to avoid sequestration. Although deﬁcit reduction may have been an
important goal of the prior Congress, changing conditions may make this no
longer the case, as was true in the latter years of GRH. Penalizing Congress
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1696.
See Dodge, supra note 51, at 855 (“The GRH lacked any mechanism that would stop future
Congresses from avoiding sequestration by amending the act to raise deﬁcit caps or repeal the caps
altogether.”); Ho, supra note 55, at 739 (“Any Member who wishes to act in contravention of the
BCA need only muster the support in Congress to waive, suspend, change the parameters, or even
change the critical statutory language . . . in order to achieve their policy objective.”).
148 Kahn, supra note 144, at 205.
149 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1696-97.
146
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for failing to address deﬁcit reduction at a time when it no longer cares about
it arguably entrenches the priorities of the enacting Congress.
On the other hand, if deﬁcit reduction is still a priority of the subsequent
Congress, it could be reasoned that the sequestration threat allows the current
majority to actualize that goal. As I have argued above, however, sequestration
is a poor mechanism to prompt deﬁcit reduction because the sequestration
levels are either too harsh or too lenient.150 When compromise is diﬃcult, as
was the case under BCA, the sequestration threat may not prove harsh enough
to overcome the political costs in achieving deﬁcit reduction.
Scholars have also criticized sunset provisions for creating entrenchment
concerns.151 A typical entrenchment provision, according to Posner and
Vermeule, “forbids the later legislature to prevent a statute from remaining in
force by an aﬃrmative repeal, while the sunset clause forbids the later
legislature to allow a statue to remain in force by declining to repeal.”152
Essentially, sunset provisions require Congress to act in order to keep a law
on the books that they may not wish to terminate. Indeed, one study has
found that committee chairs regard temporary legislation as encroaching
upon the time they could devote to other matters.153
The counter-argument to this claim is that permanent legislation also
entrenches since future congresses must expend precious legislative resources to
repeal or amend existing legislation. It could be argued that current lawmakers
are respecting the prerogatives of future lawmakers when they choose to sunset
a law by freeing them from the benefits and burdens of the law.154
There is a plausible response to this—that temporary legislation causes
more entrenchment problems than permanent legislation because a future
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1056-59 (“To the extent that sunset
provisions allow an earlier legislature to terminate a statute, causing the law to revert to its prior
incarnation (when the legislature at that time may not wish it to terminate), sunset provisions can fairly
be characterized as entrenchment mechanisms.”); Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1676-77
(arguing that sunsets and legislative entrenchment are constitutionally indistinguishable); Yin, supra
note 5, at 248-52 (arguing that sunset provisions may “potentially present[] a ‘deader hand’
problem”). But see Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 536 (2008)
(arguing that sunset clauses enhance eﬃciency by making the reversibility of policy choices easier,
hence distinguishing them from entrenchment devices); McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 128, at
444 (contrasting sunset provisions from entrenching provisions on the grounds that “[s]unset
provisions raise none of the special problems of public choice, aberrational majorities, partisanship,
or imperfect psychological heuristics,” but noting that “an excessive use of sunset provisions might
impose undue costs on future legislatures”).
152 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 129, at 1676.
153 See Christine DeGregorio, Leadership Approaches in Congressional Committee Hearings,
45 W. P OL. Q. 971, 978 (1992) (finding that almost 56% of committee chairs felt that the
“reauthorization imperative” raised by expiring temporary legislation detracted from time that
could be devoted to other matters).
154 See Fagan & Levmore, supra note 88, at 142-43 (setting forth this view and critiques of it).
150
151
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majority will wish for the continuation of policies rather than repeal. This is
because lawmakers will likely prefer the policies of the immediately prior
Congress rather than those from several congresses back. The sunset provision
essentially restores the law to an older, ostensibly less desirable policy.155
The politics surrounding EGTRRA are an illustration of the hypothesis that
older policy tends to be further removed from the current preferences of the
median voter. EGTRRA raised the estate tax exclusions, in phased-in increases,
from $1 million in 2002 to $3.5 million in 2009.156 The estate tax was completely
repealed in 2010,157 but this repeal was sunsetted after just one year,158 at which
point the estate tax exclusion would return to the 2000 level of $675,000. Instead
of letting the sunset take effect, Congress set the exclusion amount at $5 million
per year.159 Because this high exemption meant that only .06% of estates were
subject to the estate tax,160 this policy decision represents an outcome that is
much closer in ideology to total repeal than the $675,000 exemption amount,
which reached 2.16% of estates when it was in effect in 2000.161
The entrenchment concerns of sunsets hinge on whether the policy
preferences of the directly prior generation of lawmakers are superior to the
ones of further distant generations. If this is the case, then the lawmakers’
need to renew or make permanent the legislation potentially “detracts from
the ability of the new legislature to set its own agenda” as compared to a world
where the lawmakers had to do nothing to keep the preferable policies in
place.162 This is an empirical question that is diﬃcult to answer aﬃrmatively,
but it seems likely considering that sunsets are often employed precisely
because the threat of reversion to the prior policy is undesirable. Moreover,
the public may have grown accustomed to the beneﬁts of the sunsetted
legislation because of endowment eﬀects. If this is the case, then letting the
sunsetted provision lapse will be an undesirable policy outcome.
Still, sunset provisions could be said to reduce entrenchment concerns by
creating more opportunities for the future majority to let lapse the policies
of the enacting Congress and also because it provides a legislative vehicle to
which a future Congress may attach its own agenda items.163 As compared
with permanent legislation, however, the entrenchment qualities of
See Yin, supra note 5, at 248-52.
26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2006).
26 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012).
See 26 U.S.C. § 1 note (2006) (Effective and Termination Dates of 2001 Amendment)
(providing that specified 2001 amendments to the Tax Code would not apply after December 31, 2010).
159 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2012).
160 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, HISTORY, 114TH CONG., PRESENT LAW, AND ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 25 (2015).
161 Id.
162 Yin, supra note 5, at 251.
163 Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1060.
155
156
157
158
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temporary legislation seem less justiﬁable. By requiring aﬃrmative repeal,
permanent legislation, after all, signals to the public that the government’s
commitments and policies are relatively stable. The entrenchment features of
permanent legislation thus can be said to have beneﬁts and may even be
essential to implementation of the current majority’s preferences. Overall, it
cannot be stated with certainty that temporary legislation produces more
entrenchment concerns than permanent legislation, although it seems likely
to be the case. The entrenchment it does produce, however, lacks
independent, normative justiﬁcation.
3. Dynamic Legislation and Entrenchment
Scholars have expressed entrenchment concerns with regard to dynamic
legislation, but overall dynamic legislation fares well in this category.164 In
their article arguing against the entrenchment of legislation, Professors John
C. Roberts and Erwin Chemerinsky contend that the dangers of
entrenchment outweigh the stability advantages it fosters. For instance,
temporary majorities may entrench their radical policies; entrenched policies
cannot adapt to changing voting preferences, socio-economic conditions, or
available budgetary resources; and errors may not be corrected.165
Yet, dynamic legislation is designed precisely to combat many of these
problems. For instance, dynamic legislation can be used to ﬂuctuate with
available funds or socio-economic indicators. As a result, dynamic legislation
is intended to dovetail with consensus rather than hamper it. Although such
legislation may admittedly not function as intended, the ability to repeal it
should largely combat the dangers identiﬁed by Roberts and Chemerinsky.
In some circumstances, dynamic legislation may largely track vacillations
in legislative preferences or other conditions but not do so perfectly. In this
situation, it may be the case that dynamic legislation actually discourages the
legislature from updating policy. This arguably occurs because, due to the
law’s automatic updates, the deviation between the status quo and legislative
preferences may not be enough to incite Congress to action.166

164 Kamin touches upon entrenchment and concludes that indexing, one type of dynamic
legislation, presents entrenchment concerns. Kamin, supra note 11, at 24. In a later piece, Kamin is
less pessimistic with regard to dynamic legislation, concluding that all legislative devices “involve
entrenchment of one sort or another.” Kamin, supra note 5, at 171.
165 Roberts & Chemerinsky, supra note 128, at 1809-13.
166 See Kamin, supra note 11, at 26 (“Even as the mechanisms make policy more responsive in
terms of the speciﬁc information measured and the speciﬁc response triggered, it could make the
political system as a whole less responsive in other ways.”).
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One way to think about whether legislative action is likely to occur is to
model the preferences of the relative actors.167 For instance, assume the status
quo or current top tax rate is 25%. In our hypothetical, the preferences of the
relevant pivotal players have, however, shifted leftward due to increased
inequality in society. For simplicity’s sake, let’s assume that both the median
voter in the Senate and in the House prefer a tax rate of 35% while the
President prefers a rate of 40%. Further assume for simplicity’s sake that any
legislation will be implemented through the reconciliation process, which
cannot be ﬁlibustered, thus rendering the preferences of the 60th Senator
irrelevant to the model. This dynamic can be illustrated as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Zones of Legislative Action and Inaction

SQ=status quo or current policy
H=preference of the median voter in the House
S=preference of the median voter in the Senate
P=preference of the President
P
40%

HS
Zone of
Legislative Inaction

35%

SQ
Zone of
Legislative Action

25%

In the context of ordinary legislation, if a rate between the preferences
of the pivotal voters is proposed—between 35% and 40%—legislative
inaction will occur since Congress will not go along with a higher rate even
though the President would.168 If the proposed rate falls below 35% and
above 25%, however, the interests of the House, Senate, and President are
aligned to pass legislation raising the rate.
The danger with dynamic legislation, some may argue, is that automatic
updating brings the status quo closer to the policy preferences of the relevant
actors. Say, for instance, that the tax rate has been indexed for inequality by
keying it to the Gini coefficient. Because of a rise in the Gini coefficient, the
current tax rate is now 36%. This results in no legislative action. Is this
entrenching? Surely not, because the current preferences of the legislative actors
are reflected in the status quo. In this scenario, there are few, if any, policy
167 The model herein is similar to that used by Eskridge and Ferejohn, among others. Eskridge
& Ferejohn, supra note 106, at 529-32.
168 KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 38 (1998).
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choices left outside of the status quo that would appease the Senate, House, and
President. A lower rate would prove unfavorable to the President, and a higher
rate would prove unfavorable to the median voter in the Senate and House.
What if, however, the tax rate only rises to 34%? The model would predict
legislative action to occur. If so, entrenchment is also not a problem since the
current government will update the legislation according to its wishes—to 35%.
There is, however, an argument that the 34% rate is close enough to the wishes
of the legislature that it fails to act. Perhaps inaction occurs because the
legislative agenda is so crowded or relations between parties are so strained that
only the most noxious policies can be overturned. A world without dynamic
legislation, as discussed above, would produce a status quo rate of 25%, which
may be low enough to spur legislative action. Thus, so the argument goes,
dynamic legislation has the potential to entrench old preferences because it
tracks preferences as they evolve, just not well enough.169
This argument may have some validity, but as illustrated, its application is
narrow. For there to be an arguable entrenchment problem, the automatic
mechanism would have to produce a policy outcome that is just inside of the zone
of legislative action, on the boundary between action and inaction. Outside the
zone of legislative action results in no entrenchment problem and deeper inside
the zone (rightward in the above chart) is sufficient to overturn the status quo.
Additionally, legislative inaction may occur regardless of where on the
chart the status quo lies. If a crowded legislative agenda is the primary factor
behind legislative inaction, the saliency of the lower rate may spur policy
change. But the same collective action or negotiation diﬃculties may result
in gridlock no matter if the rate is 25% or 34%. Entrenchment may, therefore,
be a factor in only a subset of those already narrow cases where the policy
outcome lies just inside the zone of legislative action.
On balance, it seems that dynamic legislation oﬀers an opportunity to
combat entrenchment by relieving the legislature from having to constantly
refresh policies in light of changing conditions. This allows the legislature to
focus its energies on implementing other preferences. If dynamic legislation
is well designed, it is more likely to update legislation in accordance with
current preferences rather than entrenching policies by adjusting them to an
undesirable, but tolerable level.
In short, as with all types of legislation, dynamic legislation has features
that could contribute to the entrenchment of the current legislature’s
preferences, but these are less objectionable than those presented by
prompting legislation. A related critique may be that dynamic legislation
reduces the opportunity for Congress to deliberate because of its ability to
169 Part of this advantage is deﬁnitional. I am assuming that dynamic legislation is and can be
designed to track policy preferences.

844

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 167: 809

track policy preferences over time. Deliberation, however, is not costless. If
Congress had to deliberate every extant law on the books, this overly robust
process would harm democratic values since the current Congress would not
have the space to create its own agenda. Dynamic legislation thus represents
a tradeoﬀ between deliberation for deliberations’ sake and eﬃciently tracking
policy preferences. The compromise is likely superior from the perspective
of later congresses who are freed from woodenly revisiting the preferences of
prior congresses with whom they are in agreement.
C. Political Economy and Fairness Concerns
Aside from entrenchment, the anti-status quo devices might arguably
present other democratic concerns, like those relating to interest group
activity, fairness, and democratic accountability. These are explored below.
1. Veto Bridges and Fairness
Veto bridges are part of the body of rules Congress uses to govern itself.
In theory, they should be neutral and procedural. In practice, however, they
have been manipulated by a simple majority and hence suﬀer from
accusations of unfairness. This manipulation occurs because veto bridges are
powerful tools in advancing a partisan agenda. For instance, as discussed
above, the reconciliation process has seesawed between applying only to tax
cuts and only to tax increases.170 These tactics widen the partisan divide by
sowing distrust among the parties, thereby potentially worsening, rather than
easing, general legislative gridlock over the long haul.171
Congressional rules, like all rules of procedure, invoke the Rawlsian
concept of the “veil of ignorance.”172 Veil of ignorance rules are adopted
without the knowledge of who will proﬁt or lose from them, in something
akin to an “original position” and are thus said to represent a fair outcome.173
See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., JOHN B. GILMOUR, STRATEGIC DISAGREEMENT: STALEMATE IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 5 (1995) (identifying increased party polarization as a contributing factor to gridlock).
172 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-37 (1971) (positing that principles of
justice should be chosen behind a “veil of ignorance” such that “no one knows . . . his fortune in
the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like”);
Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 718
(2005) (making the comparison in the context of “framework legislation” or the laws that govern
congressional procedure); Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE
L.J. 399, 399 (2001) (identifying certain constitutional provisions, primarily in the congressional
arena, as veil of ignorance rules).
173 See RAWLS, supra note 172, at 136–42 (using this original position, whereby those in charge
of formulating societal rules know nothing about their position in society, as a tool to eradicate the
distorting eﬀects of knowledge of existing beneﬁciaries).
170
171
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Because congressional rules are meant merely to deﬁne the rules of the
lawmaking game, in theory, their procedural focus should prevent them from
allocating costs and beneﬁts to parties that are identiﬁable at the outset.
In practice, however, veto bridges deviate from veil of ignorance rules and
the qualities that impart fairness. A rule drafted in general terms allows
lawmakers to be ignorant of who falls within its scope, thus leading to unbiased
policymaking.174 In reality, the rules operate in specificity, thus conferring
benefits and burdens on specific groups. For instance, the reconciliation
process benefitted tax cutters, typically conservatives, when its scope was
redefined to encompass revenue-decreasing legislation and to exclude tax
increases. Parallel experiences with PAYGO rules, whereby the dominant
party has crafted specific exemptions from their scope, further exemplify this
tendency to tamper with a rule’s otherwise general scope.175
Moreover, even where rules are drafted generally, that generality may be
under-enforced due to the endogeneity of the legislative rules. Thus, a
simple majority may interpret rules in their favor without recourse. For
instance, even prior to legislative rules expressly allowing reconciliation to
reach tax cuts, Republicans obtained this result through interpreting the
existing reconciliation language to allow temporary tax cuts.176 The
procedural advantages offered by reconciliation are simply too great,
tempting the majority to engage in one-sided applications of its rules.
Durability further enhances the Rawlsian veil effect of a rule; 177 here,
too, veto bridges fall short. A rule’s longevity obscures its long-term effects,
thus forcing the lawmaker to draft a rule fairly, without knowing whether
she reaps the statute’s benefits or bears its burdens. The ruling party,
however, routinely alters veto bridges to its benefit because there is so much
at stake.178 Unlike the arduous path to constitutional amendment, or even
174 See Vermeule, supra note 172, at 412 (“The generality requirement . . . is said to produce veil
eﬀects that deprive decisionmakers of the information needed to pursue selﬁsh or partial interests.”).
175 Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1033-35.
176 See SCHICK, supra note 42.
177 See Vermeule, supra note 172, at 415-16 (discussing the relationship between durability and
fairness in the constitutional context).
178 This observation comports with the work of Sarah Binder and Douglas Dion, who conclude
that partisan calculus is a large driver of procedural change. SARAH A. BINDER, MINORITY
RIGHTS, MAJORITY RULE: PARTISANSHIP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONGRESS 9-12 (1997);
DOUGLAS DION, TURNING THE LEGISLATIVE THUMBSCREW: MINORITY RIGHTS AND
PROCEDURAL CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE POLITICS 14-18 (1997); see also Andrew-Bruhl, Return of
the Line Item Veto?, supra note 30, at 482-83 (discussing the partisan theory in the context of expedited
rescission). Binder and Douglas also do not ﬁnd support for the idea that majorities refrain from
inﬂicting harm upon minorities for fear that the reciprocity of the rules will punish them when they
are no longer in the majority. See BINDER, supra, at 9-10, 203-05; DION, supra, at 17, 248-50; see also
Andrew-Bruhl, Return of the Line Item Veto?, supra note 30, at 484 (agreeing with Binder and Douglas
in the context of expedited rescission).
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to statutory revision, a simple majority of just one house can alter legislative
rules, thus reducing their staying power. Recent developments in the Senate
regarding the nuclear option and the reconciliation process make
majoritarian rule changes much less controversial than in the past.
Accordingly, legislative rules are now more volatile.
In summary, the lack of generality and durability in veto bridges means
that they are often perceived as unfairly advantaging one party over the other,
which is what procedural rules are designed to guard against.179 Instead of
being created behind a veil of ignorance where winners now could just as
easily become losers later, the ﬂuid boundaries of veto bridges and their
temporality mean that their beneﬁciaries and benefactors are largely
identiﬁable at the outset. The rules are unlikely to be applied equally to
future, unknown legislative participants and thus can be easily manipulated.
The perception of gamesmanship in the context of reconciliation, has created
distrust among congressional members, causing greater and greater
aggressiveness in the process by the ruling party.180 Arguably, the distrust
sewn by this discord has destabilized Senate rules generally.
2. The Political Economy of Prompting Legislation
In prior work, I have discussed the political economy eﬀects of one
category of prompting legislation—sunset provisions—and concluded that,
categorically, such provisions increase rents from interest groups.181
Speciﬁcally, I argued that sunset provisions allow legislators to extract such
rents at the sunset date by threatening an unfavorable outcome.182 This
phenomenon helps to explain why legislators and lobbyists enact temporary
legislation and continue to reenact it time and time again.
One critique of this assessment is that lawmakers and lobbyists can also
extract rents by threatening to repeal or amend nonsunsetted, or permanent,
legislation.183 Yet the threat of letting a sunset expire is greater because it
requires no action as opposed to the complex machinery necessary to repeal
or amend a law. Although temporary legislation undoubtedly transfers fewer
179 See Vermeule, supra note 172, at 412; see also Andrew-Bruhl, supra note 19, at 379-80
(analogizing procedural rules to constitutional rules as a means to protect against the whims of the
ruling majority).
180 See Kysar, Reconciling Congress, supra note 5, at 2154-55; supra notes 42–49 and accompanying text.
181 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1051; see also Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra
note 5, at 393-94.
182 Kysar, Sun Also Rises, supra note 5, at 394. Rent extraction is deﬁned by threats of political
disfavor rather than promises of rewards. See FRED MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING:
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 75 (1997) (identifying and
explaining the rent extraction phenomenon).
183 See Yin, supra note 5, at 243-44.
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beneﬁts to interest groups than permanent legislation because of its limited
duration, campaign ﬁnance laws encourage lawmakers to advocate for
temporary legislation by limiting the amount of contributions a lawmaker can
receive in a given time period.184 Because the demand for legislative product
is likely limited within the legislator’s particular constituency, each lawmaker
will be motivated to preserve future demand by sunsetting legislation in the
current term.185 These phenomena may explain why, for instance, there were
only forty-four expiring tax provisions prior to the McCain–Feingold
campaign ﬁnance reform law, and over two hundred such provisions
afterwards.186 As campaign ﬁnance limits became more prevalent, so did the
legislators need to spread out rent extraction over time. Lobbyists may also
be complicit in this arrangement. They are incentivized to prefer sunsets,
which assure them continued employment.187
Additionally, interest groups may value recurrent temporary deals more
than permanent legislation for various reasons. Interest groups avoid
lobbying disclosure requirements, and hence public scrutiny, if their
contributions are staggered instead of bunched in a particular time period.
Relative valuation is also important; if interest groups have a higher cost of
capital than lawmakers, as may be the case with many business interests, the
parties are more likely to decide upon temporary legislation.188 Moreover,
184 This effect may be muted in a post-Citizens United world. Daniel Hemel has posited
that Congress’s recent move to make permanent certain temporary tax breaks, known as tax
extenders, can be explained, at least in part, by the curtailment of campaign finance restrictions
in Citizens United. Daniel Hemel, The Twilight of Tax Sunsets, U NIV. C HI. L. S CH. F AC. B LOG
(Dec. 29, 2015), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2015/12/the-twilight-of-tax-sunsets.html
[https://perma.cc/E633-92XR]. Nonetheless, campaign ﬁnance laws still limit the amounts
individuals and groups can give to candidates, PACs, and party committees and thus should still
work, at the margins, to advantage temporary over permanent legislation. I would conjecture that
the move to permanency reﬂects Congress’s frustration at having to revisit the same policy matters,
exhausting the attention they can pay to other legislative priorities. Over time, this dynamic
worsens. Much of the 2017 tax legislature was sunsetted, and we can expect Congress to enact new
temporary provisions to meet budgetary pressures.
185 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1053 (noting that because of campaign finance
laws, lawmakers can capture more benefits from repeated contributions under temporary legislation).
186 Hemel, supra note 184.
187 This is supported by anecdotal evidence from a lobbyist, who said the following:

Who wants to lose a client? . . . With [temporary tax provisions], you know you always
have someone who will help pay the mortgage. You go to the client, tell them you’re
going to ﬁght like hell for permanent extension, but tell them it’s a real long shot and
that we’ll really be lucky just to get a six-month extension. Then you go to the Hill
and strike a deal for a one-year extension. In the end, your client thinks you’re a hero
and they sign on for another year.
Pat Jones, New Day May Dawn for Sunset Tax Provisions, 66 TAX NOTES 1587, 1587 (1995)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
188 Cf. Hemel, supra note 184 (making a similar point about relative discount rates).
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corporations may pay more for temporary deals since agency costs may lead
shareholders to overemphasize short term earnings as a proxy for evaluating
managerial performance.189 The availability of temporary legislation in these
contexts will increase interest group activity at the margins, as compared to a
world without temporary legislation.
Finally, permanent legislation carries real risks, which decreases its value
to the interest group. For instance, a legislator may breach his or her duties
to the interest group because of competing demands or opportunities; the
legislator may lose oﬃce, or the legislative coalition may change.190 Although
an interest group may prefer durability in the law, it is unlikely that
lawmakers will be able to ensure the law’s survival beyond a short-term
horizon in many contexts.191 Under these circumstances, the interest group
will not pay for the long-term beneﬁt or will discount it by the probability it
will not survive. In fact, sunsets might arise precisely because one group
expects political instability in the future period that will upset any agreed
upon bargain. The interest group itself may also be unable to use future
beneﬁts due to changing circumstances or identity.192 The interest group may
thus prefer a series of temporary deals rather than a permanent one.
This view of the political economy explains the continual renewal of
sunsetted tax provisions; lawmakers and lobbyists beneﬁt from repeated
extraction of rents, and interest groups pay up because they may value the
temporality of certain beneﬁts. Sequestration functions in a manner similar
to sunsets; lawmakers use the looming threat of sequestration to continually
extract beneﬁts from interest groups. Rather than facing arbitrary
reallocation of federal resources, sequestration spurs interest groups into
action, who advocate for maintaining their particular beneﬁt. In both cases,
189 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards
Proxy Contests, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1071, 1102-03 (1990) (criticizing corporate management’s increase
in short-term earnings in order to appease shareholders who “lack perfect information”).
190 See Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 M INN. L. R EV. 913, 945-52 (1987) (describing this
phenomenon in the tax context).
191 Saul Levmore discusses how laws are more valuable to interest groups if they are more
durable. This does not necessarily mean, however, that a series of short-term deals will not be
preferable for the reasons mentioned above. Levmore also readily acknowledges that, in fact,
lawmakers cannot commit to the durability of most law, with the exception of certain spending
projects and programs “that are less vulnerable to the winds of change.” Saul Levmore, Interest Groups
and the Durability of Law, in THE TIMING OF LAWMAKING, supra note 10, at 171, 194.
192 John Macey had made a similar point: interest groups should favor narrowly tailored
legislation over broad constitutional provisions because the future beneﬁciaries of the latter are
unclear. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 246-47 (1986) (illustrating that
“even special interest groups that might beneﬁt from some speciﬁc, discrete legislative wealth
transfers are likely to object to general constitutional provisions” (emphasis added)).
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prompting legislation threatens to disrupt the existing allocation of
government resources and hence is ripe for rent extraction opportunities. It
provides, in the classic phrasing of Fred McChesney, “money for nothing.”193
3. The Political Economy of Dynamic Legislation
Dynamic legislation typically does not aﬀord the same rent-extraction
opportunities as prompting legislation. By deﬁnition, prompting legislation
overturns the legislative status quo bias through the threat of undesirable
outcomes, thus lending itself perfectly to rent extraction. Dynamic
legislation, on the other hand, overcomes the status quo bias through
spontaneous adjustments. If an interest group beneﬁts from the dynamic
legislation, a lawmaker could threaten its repeal or modiﬁcation, but this
threat would be no more forceful than with ordinary legislation, requiring
navigation through the entire lawmaking apparatus.
Another way in which dynamic legislation is undesirable to interest groups
is its relative lack of specificity concerning its future beneficiaries. Prompting
legislation contains triggering events that likely advantage one party over the
other. Sequestration, for instance, penalizes those who wish to maintain current
spending levels. Sunsetted tax cuts, on the other hand, penalize those who want
to maintain current tax cuts. The mechanism in prompting legislation of
undesirable outcomes means it is likely known which interests will be harmed.
Prompting legislation is designed to punish particular groups.
Dynamic legislation, in contrast, does not require subsequent
congressional action and thus reduces the opportunities for lawmakers to
extract rents. Indeed, the goal of dynamic legislation is to create an evolving
set of laws that minimize the need for later congressional action. In other
words, dynamic legislation attempts to preserve the pre-existing political
bargain and shifts the burden of action onto advocates of change. This feature
makes it more resilient to rent extraction.
By way of example, consider inflation and its effect on our tax system. The
tax code calculates income using a progressive rate schedule by applying
increased tax rates to brackets denominated in dollar amounts. So, for instance,
assuming there is a tax bracket of 10% on the first $10,000 of income, and 25%
on the rest, a taxpayer with $20,000 of income will pay tax of $3,500. If, over
time, these brackets are not adjusted for inflation, the tax burden will be larger
than the year before, a phenomenon known as “bracket creep.”194 Eventually,
193 MCCHESNEY, supra note 182; see also DIRE STRAITS, Money for Nothing, on BROTHERS IN
ARMS (Vertigo 1988) (describing rock musicians as earning “[m]oney for nothin’”).
194 D ONALD W. K IEFER, C ONG. R ESEARCH SERV., 83-115, T HE E FFECTS OF
INDEXATION ON TAX REVENUES AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE U.S. INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX SYSTEM 5 (1983).
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the erosion of the brackets through inflation makes a rate cut politically
necessary. Congress can then use this must-pass legislation as a vehicle to
reallocate the tax burden to certain private parties.195 This dynamic bore out
in practice, as Congress responded to bracket creep through discretionary tax
cuts, which, in turn, gave lawmakers the opportunity to reward special
interests.196 In the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act, Congress addressed
bracket creep by including automatic inflation adjustments of the tax brackets,
as well as the personal exemption,197 and thus, through dynamic legislation,
removed the discretion to threaten or reward interest groups.198
Of course, it is possible that interest groups may be able to draft dynamic
legislation keyed to indicators specific to their circumstances, thus ensuring
that their benefits will be maintained down the line and in accordance with the
group’s future needs. Compared to ordinary legislation, so the argument would
go, this feature may be undesirable since, on balance, it may produce more deals
between lawmakers and interest groups. For instance, Congress currently
provides an excise tax exemption for wooden arrows designed for use by
children that consist of all natural wood that measures 5/16 of an inch or less in
diameter, and are not suitable for use with a bow that has a maximum draw
weight of thirty pounds or more.199 Drafted narrowly to benefit a company
called Rose City Archery, the precise nature of the legislation ensures its scope
is that of the company and no other. Suppose, however, that the lawmakers
drafted the law to update automatically, perhaps pegging the size of the tax
relief inversely to the company’s market share of the industry. Such an
arrangement may increase the value of the legislative deal to Rose City since it
allocates the tax relief according to the company’s needs at a given time.
Still, the ability to craft beneﬁts that will follow the characteristics and
requirements of an interest group over time is a narrow critique of dynamic
195 Dynamic legislation can decrease special interest benefits in idiosyncratic ways. For instance,
the standard deduction dilutes the value of the itemized deductions, such as the mortgage interest
deduction, which benefits interest groups like the real estate industry. This is because taxpayers can
claim the standard deduction without regard to their circumstances. Indexing the standard deduction
for inflation, as is the case under current law, ensures that the standard deduction continues to dilute
itemized deductions, perhaps at an increasing rate, thus harming the special interests that benefit from
the itemized deductions. See Alan L. Feld, Silent Tax Changes: The Political Economy of Indexing for
Inflation 16-17 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 15-35, 2015),
https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2015/12/FeldA09212015paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WA2-2QMC]
(noting that the standard deduction was 57.8% of the average itemized deductions in 2010 for AGIs
between $40,000 and $50,000, compared to 50.2% in 1990 for the same AGI interval).
196 See id. at 10 (stating that discretionary adjustments “allow for selective cuts in the rates”).
197 See Lawrence M. Axelrod, Chain, Chain, Chain: Taxes and Chained CPI, 139 T AX
N OTES 461, 461 (2013).
198 See Feld, supra note 195, at 12 (arguing that automatic adjustments take away the power of
legislators to “provide targeted beneﬁts for supporters and friends”).
199 26 U.S.C. § 4161(b)(2)(B) (2012).
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legislation since many types of dynamic legislation will not present this
result. In contrast, prompting legislation, by its very nature, tends to exploit
interest groups due to its threats to the status quo. Additionally, dynamic
legislation, even if drafted narrowly, also carries the signiﬁcant risk that any
particular interest group will eventually fall outside its scope (thereby
increasing the cost of the legislation relative to its beneﬁts) or, alternatively,
that others will fall inside the scope (thereby beneﬁtting its competitors). The
evolutive character of dynamic legislation may mean that, compared with
ordinary legislation, the legislative beneﬁts are less valuable to interest groups.
The time-limited nature of temporary legislation, in contrast, minimizes the
risk that legislative beneﬁts will go unused by the intended party.
It could also be argued that dynamic legislation shields lawmakers from
accountability since they do not have to act for the law to change.200 Thus,
voters may unfairly attribute the policy changes of dynamic legislation to prior
generations of lawmakers. The flipside of this argument, however, is that the
failure to automatically adjust policy may allow lawmakers to skirt public
judgment for the consequences of that failure. In other words, when compared
with dynamic legislation, which generally preserves the distribution of costs
and benefits through evolving circumstances, static legislation represents a
deviation from that bargain for which lawmakers should be held responsible.
For instance, not updating our progressive tax rate structure to reflect inflation
would allow for the slow but steady increase of taxes without public notice.
Moreover, this would impact most acutely taxpayers in the middle brackets,
thereby undoing the status quo distribution of the tax burden.201 This
difference in framing what constitutes a policy change means that static
legislation, even more so than dynamic legislation, can be criticized for
protecting current lawmakers against public accountability.
D. Integrity of the Budget Process
One often overlooked criterion for evaluating the democratic function of
lawmaking tools is their interaction with the budget process. Budgeting is an
essential aspect of the democratic process, allowing for expression of
lawmakers’ decisions over government spending and investment.202 It ensures
that information on long-term budget impacts and various policy trade-oﬀs
are made available to voters and lawmakers. It coordinates decisionmaking
200 See Kamin, supra note 11, at 22 (arguing that, on balance, dynamic legislation shields
current lawmakers from direct accountability).
201 See Feld, supra note 195, at 11-12.
202 See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON BUDGET CONCEPTS, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S
COMMISSION ON BUDGET CONCEPTS 11 (1967); see also Block, supra note 60, at 899-904 (2002)
(discussing the democracy-oriented goals of the budget process).
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both within the current Congress and across diﬀerent congresses. The budget
rules assist Congress in abiding by their budgeting choices, through tools like
PAYGO, spending caps, and other points of order.203
Along the budgeting axis, dynamic legislation has a distinct advantage over
prompting legislation because it does not require later action from Congress.
In this manner, it limits the opportunity for Congress to defect from
budgetary constraints it has previously imposed on itself. A bit of background
on budget rules, and their application to temporary legislation, helps to
understand why this feature of dynamic legislation is so important.
1. Budgetary Games, Prompting Legislation, and Veto Bridges
Gamesmanship plagues the budgetary system. This is because budget
rules serve as very weak precommitment devices and can be avoided at a
later point in time.204 Budget rules exist because lawmakers have a primary
goal of budgetary responsibility when they are conceived, at Time 1, but
lawmakers also know that, at the time of the rule’s application, Time 2, they
will face pressures from their constituents to deliver costly legislative
benefits. They thus collectively agree upon a set of rules that impose costs
upon them when they deviate from the path of fiscal discipline. Yet unlike
true precommitment devices, which require a binding force external to the
tempted,205 these rules can be evaded at Time 2.
Later pressure to deliver legislative benefits is great, and lawmakers
can and do interpret the rules in manners that allow them to escape their
penalties at that later point in time. The more times the legislature has to
apply the rules in order to effectuate policy, the more likely it is that it
Block, supra note 60, at 901.
For a discussion of legislative rules as precommitment devices, see Elizabeth Garrett,
Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Oﬀset Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 501, 512-13 n.43 (1998), in which she describes supermajority requirements, among other
legislative rules as “operat[ing] as precommitment devices to avoid collective action problems that
reduce Congress’s ability to achieve preferred policy outcomes”; see also, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett,
The Purposes of Framework Legislation, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 717, 751 (2005), identifying
precommitment as the driving force behind some legislative rules; and Nancy C. Staudt,
Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1998), calling a balancedbudget amendment a precommitment tool.
205 See Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of
Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759-60 (2003) (noting that “the individual can enlist others in the
effort to bind himself” while “[b]y contrast, there is nothing external to society” to bind society in its entirety).
For the foundational works in precommitment theory, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 36-111 (1979); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (expanding on the ideas
Elster presented in the title essay of ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS); Thomas C. Schelling, Ethics, Law, and
the Exercise of Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 83, 96-107 (1984); Thomas C. Schelling,
The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, in CHOICE AND CONSEQUENCE 57, 76-82 (1984).
203
204

2019]

Dynamic Legislation

853

will engage in evasion of the rules by orchestrating and arbitraging
differences in the budgetary treatment of its actions. Prompting
legislation requires several layers of congressional action and thus
increases the likelihood of budgetary gamesmanship.
Temporary legislation is a good example of the budgetary system’s inherent
weakness. As discussed above, the sunset provisions of the Bush tax cuts were
borne out of the reconciliation process. In prior work, I critiqued the sunsets
of the Bush tax cuts, along with other sunsets in the tax code, for engaging in
fiscal illusion since they would likely be renewed without full accounting of
their costs.206 In fact, this ploy is precisely what ended up happening. When a
portion of the Bush tax cuts were made permanent in the American Taxpayer
Relief Act of 2012, Congress specifically exempted that law from statutory
PAYGO despite the law increasing the deficit by nearly $4 trillion.207 History
repeated itself in 2015 when Congress permanently enacted a subset of the
perpetually expiring tax provisions, the so-called tax “extenders.” Just as it did
with the Bush tax cuts, Congress exempted the extenders from PAYGO, thus
never paying for the $622 billion worth of tax cuts.208
This gamesmanship occurred because of several dynamics. First, the
political impetus to extend the cuts was enormous; once the populace was
used to low tax rates, it was hard to take them away. Since there was
nothing to hold Congress to its rules, it bent them under the weight of
such pressure when they reconsidered the sunsets. Second, contrary to the
prediction of pro-sunset scholars,209 Congress and other actors eroded the
stability of the budget baseline (or the starting point for measuring the
costs of legal change210). This erosion, in turn, allowed for immunity from
the PAYGO rules.211 Many of the major new provisions in the 2017 tax act
206 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1026-41 (“The JGTRRA tax provisions were
made temporary, in part, to reduce the costs of the legislation as agreed upon by the legislators
in light of a growing deficit.”).
207 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN AN AMENDMENT IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE
TO H.R.8, THE “AMERICAN TAXPAYER RELIEF ACT OF 2012,” AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON
JANUARY 1, 2013 (2013).
208 The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-1113 § 1001, 129 Stat. 3035 (2015).
209 Pro-sunset scholars argue that temporary legislation actually enhances ﬁscal restraint
because there is a thorough reckoning of its costs upon each legislative reenactment, unlike
permanent legislation, which continues without legislative action even though it incurs costs beyond
the budget window. See Yin, supra note 5, at 180. This argument, however, depends upon consistent
application of the budget baseline, an assumption that has not borne out in practice. See Kamin &
Kysar, supra note 49, at 129-30 (“Although Republicans have called for the current policy baseline to
be used in the context of the tax extenders already in place, they have notably failed to do so for any
new temporary tax cuts that are enacted with tax reform.”).
210 See Kamin, supra note 2, at 147 (“The budget baseline . . . is the starting point of the legal
regime with budgetary eﬀect.”).
211 See Kysar, Lasting Legislation, supra note 5, at 1026-35 (predicting this outcome).
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are temporary, and we can expect Congress to again erase the costs of
extension as those sunsets approach.
The story of congressional experience with sequestration is similar in
many ways to that of temporary legislation. In these cases, budget rules that
Congress created were later circumvented when Congress found the pressure
to deliver legislative beneﬁts too great. In the early 2000s, for instance,
sequestration was repeatedly avoided because Congress ordered the OMB to
zero out or reduce PAYGO balances.212
2. Dynamic Legislation and the Budget Process
In contrast to the other anti-status quo devices, dynamic legislation reduces
budgetary gamesmanship because it does not require multiple stages of
congressional action. The point of dynamic legislation, after all, is to minimize
the need for later congressional action. Dynamic legislation accordingly does
not provide as many opportunities that tempt Congress to defect from its
budgetary goals at subsequent points in time. To be sure, we can anticipate
some budgetary gimmicks upon the bill’s original enactment. For instance,
Congress could delay the automatic adjustment period beyond the budgetary
window if so doing would reduce the bill’s costs. But the gaming opportunities
presented by dynamic legislation are diminished since, unlike prompting
legislation, it does not require Congress to act consistently over time.213
Although dynamic legislation does not readily lend itself to budget
gamesmanship, it does present estimating difficulties because of its
conditional nature. To some extent, however, the Congressional Budget Office
and the other estimators have experience with such an undertaking. For
instance, revenue estimators currently assume certain changes in the consumer
price index (“CPI”) when scoring inflation-indexed tax legislation.214 These
assumptions infuse the revenue estimate with a degree of uncertainty, but one
that does not jeopardize the usefulness of the revenue-estimating exercise.
Although the estimators at the Congressional Budget Oﬃce (“CBO”) and
Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”)215 will have less experience with new
indices that Congress relies upon or creates, the sorts of challenges they
present are not insurmountable and, in many senses, are less serious than
212 H.R. REP. NO. 107-350, at 114 (2002) (Conf. Rep.); see also Block, supra note 60, at 866
(“Congress simply directed the OMB . . .to change the sequester balance to zero.”).
213 See Kamin & Kysar, supra note 49, at 126 (identifying the inconsistent application of the
budget baseline between enactment and renewal of temporary tax provisions as the source of budget
gamesmanship in that context).
214 See Christopher J. Puckett, Is the Experiment Over? The OMB’s Decision to Change the Game
Through a Shortening of the Forecast, 11 GEO. J. POVERTY LAW & POL’Y 169, 183-85 (analyzing the
factors considered by CBO when estimating Medicare costs).
215 See SCHICK, supra note 42.
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those typically faced by the estimators. CBO and JCT routinely incorporate
behavioral changes that generate budgetary savings or costs into their revenue
estimates. For instance, CBO and JCT revenue estimates include changes in
crop output based on new agricultural policies, diﬀerences in the take-up rate
of certain government beneﬁts due to alterations to those beneﬁts, and
modiﬁcations to capital gains realizations in response to variations in the
capital gains rate—all uncertain variables. The revenue estimators have even
recently begun to incorporate changes in behavior that have macroeconomic
eﬀects, a notoriously complex and diﬃcult modeling exercise.216 Moreover,
prompting legislation also poses revenue-estimating problems, since the
likelihood of sequester or sunset is indeterminate. Scoring dynamic
legislation may be less of a challenge than these categories since the range of
legislative outcomes it produces may, in fact, be narrower, avoiding the policy
cliﬀs that prompting legislation produces.
Importantly, dynamic legislation could be harnessed to improve upon the
budget process. Congress could automatically adjust a law, scaling up or down
its beneﬁts and burdens, to meet a certain revenue target. For instance, many
times Congress wishes to enact revenue neutral legislation. As circumstances
play out, however, legislation may start losing (or raising) revenues. Congress
could instead enact automatic adjustments of the law’s provisions to ensure
that revenue neutrality is maintained over time. In contrast to most budget
rules, which can be overcome by a simple majority vote in a single house,
Congress would only be able to circumvent this type of constraint through
the Article I lawmaking apparatus. I revisit this possibility below when I
discuss implementation of dynamic legislation.217
To summarize, although dynamic legislation presents some challenges for
the budget process, it does not present as many occasions for pernicious
budgetary gamesmanship as the other anti-status quo devices. Notably, it also
presents opportunities to meet budgetary goals in a more eﬀective manner
than normal budget rules.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
The above discussion has shown the democratic advantages of dynamic
legislation. Other considerations, however, might counsel in favor of employing
prompting legislation or veto bridges in certain situations. There may be
legitimate reasons to use prompting legislation or veto bridges—such as sunsets
in times of experimentation or emergencies—that override the democratic
216 See S. Con. Res. 11, 114th Cong. (2015) (requiring CBO to incorporate macroeconomic
eﬀects into its cost estimates for major legislation).
217 See, e.g., infra note Part IV.B.5.a.
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disadvantages of the tool. Some tools may also be better at others depending
on the particular cause of the gridlock in question. Additionally, the devices
may be used in conjunction with one another. For instance, the legislature could
enact dynamic legislation through the reconciliation process if bipartisan
consensus cannot be achieved. Dynamic legislation could also be sunsetted on
an experimental basis, giving the government an opportunity to assess its
effectiveness as a new lawmaking tool. The choice is not necessarily one or the
other, but democratic considerations tend to support the use of dynamic
legislation, all else being equal. This next section will explore the circumstances
in which the use of dynamic legislation is particularly promising.
A. General Principles for Applicability
As a categorical matter, dynamic legislation will likely have greater
application when (a) it can be designed with low costs and (b) the law
presents problems in the aforementioned areas where dynamic legislation
excels—institutional interaction with the administrative state,
entrenchment, the political economy, and the budget process.
As for the former, we can expect dynamic legislation to be more easily
crafted when the external indicia to which it responds can be quantiﬁed. The
drafting process is simpliﬁed if the law changes in accordance with formulas
or multipliers rather than fact-speciﬁc ranges of circumstances. Better yet is
if the various aspects along which the law is changing are not only quantiﬁable
but are able to be compiled into one index. Ever changing law also risks costly
implementation, but the interpretation and application of the evolving legal
landscape will be simpler if legal changes respond to clear numerics.
If the automating mechanisms are easily quantiﬁable, it may also be more
likely that Congress can reach consensus on the law. This is because of the
obvious and somewhat circular point, that more easily quantiﬁable
mechanisms mean there is less doubt with regard to their validity in the ﬁrst
place. For instance, if climate change risk can be quantiﬁed and rolled into a
single index this likely means that scientiﬁc knowledge has coalesced around
the legitimacy of certain environmental indicators and their impact.
Quantifiability, however, may also meaningfully and positively influence
political compromise since it can reduce the amount of uncertainty in the
direction that the law will take. Lawmakers who fear that the law will
develop into unanticipated iterations can be somewhat assuaged if a
numeric range cabins that evolutive path.
That being said, quantifiability is a helpful but by no means sufficient
condition to the enactment of dynamic legislation. First, deciding upon the
makeup of the index may prove vexing. In the inflation context, for
instance, a longstanding debate still exists between which measure of
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inflation should be used, and just recently Congress switched to an
alternative measure in the tax context.218
Even if an index is developed and agreed upon, there is still the need to
apply that index to policy. How should, for instance, carbon tax rates respond to
fluctuations in a climate change index? Drafting a policy response to each
variation of the index at first seems like a daunting task. In many cases, however,
policy responses will often be calibrated proportionately to such changes so that
Congress need only determine the relationship between a single metric—or
metrics within a specified range—and the policy impact. The policy choice, in
these instances, really looks no less complex than ordinary legislation.
Dynamic legislation will also be most desirable in those contexts where it
outperforms other anti-status quo devices. For instance, if a category of
legislation is expected to produce political economy concerns because of
outsized interest group inﬂuence, then the ability of dynamic legislation to
reign in this inﬂuence, or at least not exacerbate it compared to prompting
legislation, will be particularly valuable. Due to its insusceptibility to
budgetary gamesmanship, dynamic legislation will also be worthwhile to
pursue in an area of law that interacts heavily with the budgetary process.
Moreover, we can expect dynamic legislation to pay oﬀ in legislative contexts
that present challenges to delegating policy to the administrative state.
We can expect that certain areas of law will be more or less conducive to
the employment of dynamic legislation, depending on whether they share the
aforementioned features. Notably, ﬁscal legislation has many of these
characteristics. First, at the risk of stating the obvious, ﬁscal policy is an area
of law whose features are heavily quantiﬁable. We can automatically adjust
these features with relative ease because the inputs are quantiﬁable, and they
interface quite naturally with indices for this reason as well.
In addition to presenting relatively low design costs, ﬁscal policy also
interacts problematically with the political economy, the administrative state,
and the budget process, meaning that the beneﬁts that dynamic legislation
can provide along these axes are substantial. For instance, collective action
problems may mean that interest groups are able to secure tax beneﬁts at the
expense of the general public.219 As mentioned above, the interface of ﬁscal
policy and the administrative state presents special diﬃculties since there
may be constitutional, historical, and normative reasons for favoring less
delegation in this area.220 Finally, ﬁscal policy interacts heavily with the
budget process. The strong political pressures to deliver beneﬁts through the
218 See Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11002, 131 Stat. 2054, 2059 (converting
cost-of-living adjustments to chained CPI from CPI).
219 See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357, 369 (1980).
220 See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
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tax code makes this interaction dysfunctional, causing lawmakers to game
PAYGO and budget reconciliation rules in the name of tax cuts.221
Perhaps because of these characteristics, this area of the law already
contains automatic features. For instance, many federal tax provisions are
indexed for inﬂation, as previously discussed.222 Still, there is much more
room for experimentation and implementation of dynamic legislation in the
ﬁscal policy and other contexts, as will be discussed below. One particularly
promising aspect of dynamic legislation, which the below examples help
illustrate, is that it allows Congress to adjust laws automatically to take into
account whether they are meeting expectations. In this manner, dynamic
legislation can function as a means for Congress to self-evaluate.
B. Potential Applications
1. Pigouvian and Similar Taxes
One area where dynamic legislation should be considered is in the
Pigouvian tax context. Under economic theory, markets fail when parties do
not bear the full costs of their actions, thereby producing negative
externalities. Governments can impose Pigouvian taxes in the amount of such
externalities, which then cause the parties to internalize the costs of their
actions.223 The parties are then able to make an economically efficient decision,
weighing an action’s full costs upon the world against its benefits.
Of course, assessing the social costs of the activity, and hence the correct
level of taxation, still poses design challenges. Dynamic legislation could
address one aspect of this complexity—the social costs of an activity, or the
information used to calculate them, may not be static. A unit of pollution
may impact society differently from year to year. In that case, a tax assessed
on the pollution itself may be correct initially but may then deviate from the
socially optimal level if the social harm per unit increases or decreases. For
instance, new information may indicate that the climate is more sensitive to
carbon dioxide emissions than previously thought. Dynamic legislation,
perhaps coupled with delegation to a regulating entity, could dynamically
adjust the tax rates to account for these changes.224

See supra notes 205–214 and accompanying text.
States have also employed automatic adjustments in the tax context. See David Gamage,
Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the Fiscal Volatility Problem, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 749, 802-04 (2010)
(“In . . . the property tax systems of twenty-two states . . . the amount of revenue raised is held constant
as the economy cycles, with tax rates automatically adjusted so as to maintain the revenue targets.”).
223 See generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (5th ed. 2015).
224 See Kamin, supra note 5, at 251-53 (making a similar suggestion in this context).
221
222
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Many in the environmental ﬁeld challenge the idea that setting tax rates
equal to the social costs of the pollution is suﬃcient since this will not
necessarily result in the reduction of emissions. The argument is that the tax
must also be greater than the marginal cost of abatement, otherwise the
polluting ﬁrm will not reduce emissions.225 Dynamic legislation could also be
employed to address this challenge by dynamically adjusting the tax in
response to whether current activities or behaviors, in this case emissions,
exceed or fall short of a target level. Dynamic legislation, in this case,
leverages the additional information that the implementation of the tax would
provide—the cost of abatement.
One carbon tax proposal, for instance, would create an initial tax, coupled
with a standard growth rate for the tax that would be applicable during a control
period.226 Emission targets could be set for certain time intervals. If the targets
were unmet, the imposition of a higher growth rate for the tax would be
triggered, which would turn off once emissions fell below the target.227
2. Nontraditional Phase-Ins and Phase-Outs
One promising application would be to use dynamic legislation to phase
in legislative changes. There is an old adage that legal reforms produce
winners and losers. Phase-ins can mitigate the negative impact upon certain
parties. Typically, phase-ins work by gradually implementing policies as time
passes. Rather than make the transition contingent on dates, however, one
could employ dynamic legislation to make the provisions contingent upon the
occurrence of external events. This type of phase-in could be particularly
useful where new policies present uncertainties as to how they will interact
with the real world. One could design the legislative phase-in so that the
change is ratcheted up only after certain events occur or if there is evidence
that the change is generating the desired eﬀects.228
225 See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 69-70
(2003) (“[A] system designed to use economic incentives to improve environmental quality must
establish tax rates exceeding the marginal cost of reductions.”).
226 See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Cost Containment in Climate Change Policy: Alternative Approaches in
Mitigating Price Volatility, 29 VA. TAX REV. 381, 391-92 (2009) (noting that under “the Responsive
Emissions Autonomous Carbon Tax (REACT) . . . . [a]n initial tax and standard growth rate for the
tax is set for the ﬁrst year of a control period.”).
227 Id.; see also Larry Karp & John Livernois, Using Automatic Tax Changes to Control Pollution
Emissions, 27 J. ENVT’L. ECON. & MGMT. 38 (1994) (noting that an “iterative procedure which
adjusts the tax when emissions exceed or fall short of the target” could be used to overcome the
problem of lack of information about abatement costs).
228 Charles Whitehead has made a similar suggestion in the regulatory context—that new
regulation on the ﬁnancial markets be phased in to accommodate unanticipated consequences.
Regulators could use the information provided at the initial phase-in stage to then change the
regulation if necessary. This protects against signiﬁcant adverse outcomes that would arise if the
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For instance, central to a recent tax reform proposal was a cash ﬂow
destination-based tax, which would have turned the current corporate income
tax into essentially a consumption tax.229 The plan was border adjusted,
meaning that it excludes exports and taxes imports without deduction for
costs.230 Controversially, the plan may have impacted prices on imports.
Under economic models, the value of the dollar should, however,
correspondingly increase, making the tax neutral vis-à-vis American
consumers and importers.231 Skepticism in the business and investment
community regarding the currency adjustments, however, turned out to be a
major political obstacle to its enactment.232
One way to assuage those nervous about relying on untested models would
be to phase in the tax, not simply across time, but to peg its introduction to
the dollar adjustment. The tax rate could be designed such that it increases by
a specified percentage for every x% increase in the dollar. This transition rule
would minimize any negative effects on consumers and importers because the
lower rate would cap the impact on consumer prices, perhaps appeasing critics
to a sufficient degree to allow for enactment of the tax.233
Tom Merrill and David Schizer’s petroleum fuel price stabilization plan
(PFSP) also proposes dynamic phase-ins. The PFSP would set a ﬂoor of

regulation was ﬁnalized at the outset. See Charles K. Whitehead, The Goldilocks Approach: Financial
Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1273 (2012).
229 See HOUSE TAX REFORM TASK FORCE, A BETTER WAY, OUR VISION FOR A
CONFIDENT AMERICA: TAX 27-29 (2016), https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_062416.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEZ6-3Z6B].
230 Id. at 28 (“[V]alue-added taxes (VATs) . . . include ‘border adjustability’ . . . . This means
that the tax is rebated when a product is exported to a foreign country and is imposed when a product
is imported from a foreign country.”).
231 See Alan J. Auerbach & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, AM. ACTION F., The Role of Border
Adjustments in International Taxation (2016), https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/14344
[https://perma.cc/MS28-UK28] (“An export subsidy . . . . would also strengthen the dollar as a
result of the surge in demand for exports, which would partially reduce this demand surge by
raising the cost of . . . goods abroad.”).
232 See Richard Rubin, What We Know About Border Adjustment and How It Would Work, WALL
ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-we-know-about-border-adjustment-andhow-it-would-work-1485723571 [https://perma.cc/Z37E-MAWZ] (noting that “large retailers, oil
reﬁners and some conservative groups” worry that taxing imports will cause prices to go up).
233 To be sure, this feature would present design diﬃculties. First, an economic slowdown may
occur, thus impeding the dollar’s increase. Alternatively, the dollar may increase for reasons other
than the tax. Accordingly, it may be diﬃcult to parse out if appreciation due to the border adjustment
has in fact occurred. It may also be necessary to “back-date” the currency adjustment since the dollar
will adjust once the border adjustment proposal looks plausible, perhaps necessitating averaging
mechanisms. Still, a rough justice rule could suﬃce here. No matter what contributes to the dollar
appreciation, if it occurs, it will go a long way to assuaging the fear of importers. A second problem
occurs if you phase in the tax’s exclusion for exports. This may harm exporters who would have a
diﬃcult time selling their goods abroad. Phasing in only the import side while also providing full
exclusion for exports immediately would, however, generate substantial revenue losses.
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$3.50-$4.00 per gallon of gas and would assess a fuel levy if the price of gas
fell below that threshold.234 The levy would rise as world oil prices fell and,
conversely, would fall as prices rose. One version of the plan employs a
traditional phase-in, raising the price threshold over time.235 However,
another variation adopts a type of nontraditional phase-in by providing that
the threshold trail any upward movements of the retail price, until the
threshold is set to the desired level.236
3. Countercyclical Laws
In times of economic downturn, lawmakers and regulators can employ
tools to assist in stabilizing the economy. Monetary policy is the most often
employed countercyclical measure largely because the Federal Reserve can
quickly adjust interest rates in response to economic conditions. Post-Great
Recession, however, many economists have questioned whether monetary
policy alone is a suﬃcient response, especially in the face of dramatic
downturns.237 There might be a ﬂoor, for instance, to which interest rates can
be lowered without harmfully impacting the dollar or creating future
bubbles.238 Fiscal policy, such as increased spending and tax cuts, may then
be necessary. Other advantages to ﬁscal policy are that they are often faster
acting and can be crafted to reach speciﬁc recipients.239
Still, economists and others often distrust countercyclical ﬁscal measures
because of design diﬃculties.240 In order to be eﬀective and not
234 Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an Economic Downturn: A Proposed
Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5, 32 (2010). The PFSP essentially
stabilizes oil prices so that they will not decline below a ﬂoor. This incentivizes consumers and
manufactures to commit to investments in new behavior and technology.
235 Id. at 9-10.
236 Id. at 10.
237 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical? 7 (CoaseSandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 782, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2866464 (“[T]he Federal Reserve’s ability to stimulate the economy by
lowering interest rates is limited. In a severe economic downturn, even lowering interest rates to
zero might not be enough to eﬀectively stimulate the economy.”).
238 See Summers Testimony on Fiscal Stimulus, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2008),
https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2008/01/16/summers-testimony-on-fiscal-stimulus, [hereinafter Summers
Testimony] (reprinting Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers’s testimony before the Joint
Economic Committee in which he stated that “full reliance on monetary policy could easily mean
lowering interest rates to levels that would be problematic for the dollar, commodity prices, future
asset bubbles and moral hazard”).
239 Id.
240 See J. Bradford DeLong and Laura D. Tyson, Discretionary Fiscal Policy as a Stabilization
Policy Tool: What Do We Think Now That We Did Not Think in 2007? 2 (April 5, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.imf.rg/external/np/seminars/eng/2013/ﬁscal/pdf/tyson.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZY4X-EBDT] (“Legislatures are, by design, institutions that ﬁnd it very diﬃcult
to make decisions quickly . . . . Fiscal policies that take eﬀect this year as a result of decisions made
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counterproductive, ﬁscal stimulus must be “timely, temporary, and
targeted.”241 Dynamic legislation can be utilized to achieve all three of these
factors, and so could be employed in the countercyclical context, both in the
tax and spending areas. First, dynamic legislation can be designed to
immediately spring into life once a measure of economic weakness occurs,
thus ensuring that the legislative response is timely. Possible triggers could
be the unemployment rate, negative economic growth, or when the federal
funds rate is at or near 0%.242 Dynamic legislation can also phase out as those
conditions improve to ensure it is temporary. Finally, ﬁscal policy generally
allows for targeted relief—for instance to the middle and lower classes—in a
way that monetary policy cannot. Dynamic legislation might oﬀer the ability
to target measures even further. For instance, it could be used to deliver
beneﬁts to those regions most aﬀected by the downturn. Regional provisions
are discussed below.243
Recent scholarship has focused on how the legal system might respond to
macroeconomic conditions. Zachary Liscow has proposed that bankruptcy
rules be “counter-cyclical,” prescribing that bankruptcy judges consider the
employment eﬀects of their cases based on the unemployment rate.244
Although interesting, this proposal suﬀers from the critique that it stretches
the institutional competence of the judiciary, which may be ill-equipped to
make judgments concerning the economy at large. A Congress-centered
approach that sets countercyclical measures into motion upon the presence of
certain indicators as is proposed herein, does not face this structural critique.

by a legislature last year based on information from two or three years ago would seem to guarantee
sub-optimal economic outcomes.”).
241 Summers Testimony, supra note 238.
242 Masur and Posner consider each of these triggers in the context of countercyclical
regulation. See Masur & Posner, supra note 237, at 26-28.
243 See infra notes 246–248 and accompanying text.
244 Zachary Liscow, Counter-Cyclical Bankruptcy Law: An Efficiency Argument for EmploymentPreserving Bankruptcy Rules, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2016) (proposing “to systematize
what is currently an ad hoc trade-off by making bankruptcy law explicitly counter-cyclical-that
is, placing more weight on preserving employment during times of high unemployment”). For
other work suggesting that the law should take into account macroeconomic factors, see Zachary
D. Liscow & William A. Woolston, How Income Taxes Should Change During Recessions, 70 TAX L.
REV. 627 (2017) (recommending maximizing social welfare by subsidizing nonemployment and
subsidizing employers for hiring, as opposed to employees); Yair Listokin, Law and
Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 559,
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828352 (positing that the law should
promote spending in times of recessions); Yair Listokin, A Theoretical Framework for Law and
Macroeconomics (Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 567, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2860283 (exploring the situations in which the law should respond to
macroeconomic concerns). Cf. Masur & Posner, supra note 237 (cautioning that countercyclical regulation
be adopted on an experimental basis given the uncertainty in underlying empirical assumptions).
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4. Regionally Targeted Legislation
Another area where dynamic legislation could be eﬀectively employed is
legislation targeted to regions.245 Fine tuning federal policy in this manner
might generate positive welfare eﬀects. Take, for instance, the fact that federal
taxes are assessed on nominal incomes, without regard to cost of living
diﬀerences between areas. This policy discourages taxpayers from working
and living in higher-paying cities. Although salaries and property values
adjust to make up for the federal tax disparity, the non-neutrality between tax
bills in locales results in an ineﬃcient employment distribution. Indexing
taxes to local wages, however, would neutralize most of this distortion.246
Automatically tying federal beneﬁts to the speciﬁc needs of a region could
also be beneﬁcial from fairness and budgetary standpoints. In the
countercyclical context, for instance, extensions of federal unemployment
insurance are automatically triggered if state unemployment conditions
exceed a certain threshold.247 This type of program has the potential to
engender fairness by ensuring the residents of the neediest states receive
beneﬁts. It also saves costs by narrowly tailoring beneﬁts and by allowing
those beneﬁts to be calculated with administrative ease.
Extending regional automatic mechanisms to other spending programs
could produce similar beneﬁts. Suppose, for instance, that Congress adopted
measures to address the opioid epidemic, which is a nationwide crisis with
varying and ﬂuctuating degrees of severity across regions.248 It could decide
to allocate funds on a continuing basis according to the extent of the crisis at
the state level, using factors such as overdose and addiction rates. Other crises
could be addressed in a similar manner. Ongoing disaster preparedness funds,
for instance, could be distributed to states in accordance with their climaterelated risks. Or funds for adult education could be distributed to those states
hit hardest by the overall decline in manufacturing jobs.
Dynamic legislation allows Congress to adapt federal policy to regional
needs. The political events of the twenty-ﬁrst century suggest widespread
frustration that the federal government has failed to address the fact that the
245 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et al., Bridging the Red-Blue Divide: A Proposal for U.S.
Regional Tax Relief, (Univ. of Mich. Public Law Research Paper No. 620), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3249010 (exploring fiscal equalization mechanisms and recommending
federal tax relief to corporations who invest in poorer locations in the U.S.).
246 See generally Albouy, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 9; Knoll & Griﬃth, supra note 9.
247 Stephen Bingham, Replace Welfare for Contingent Workers with Unemployment Compensation,
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 937, 952 (1995). Some would contend that the threshold is set too high, thus
preventing access to the program by those in need, but this is not a criticism of the automatic
mechanism per se. See id.
248 See, e.g., Drug Overdose Death Data, C TRS . FOR D ISEASE C ONTROL & P REVENTION
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data/statedeaths.html [https://perma.cc/728R-3Q7W] (providing
overdose statistics by state).
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rewards and strains of the modern economy fall unevenly across states,
creating winners and losers. We can expect that the complexities of challenges
like globalization, the displacement of jobs by technology, and climate change
will continue to have varied, regional eﬀects. Rather than employing blunt
instruments, the federal government would beneﬁt states by using carefully
crafted remedies. With dynamic legislation, Congress can do so without
needing to continually revisit the law and without ceding control over policy
to the executive branch.
5. Intralegal and Budgetary Measures
a. Overall budget constraints
One most naturally thinks of dynamic legislation as allowing for the law
to adjust based on external factors. Dynamic legislation, however, can also be
used so that the law responds to changes within other parts of the legal
system. This would create interesting opportunities to coordinate broad social
policies across areas of law by tying them together. For instance, health care
policy could be adjusted, not only for current health care costs, but also for
current entitlement commitments and tax expenditures in the area.
Intralegal measures might be especially powerful when used in
conjunction with an overall budget constraint. In contrast to internal budget
rules, the budgetary constraint could be built into the substance of the law.
Congress thus would find it much less easy to evade. For instance, in the
early 1980s, proposed legislation would have limited the amount of revenue
lost to tax expenditures to no more than thirty percent of the net revenues
collected in the fiscal year.249 The mechanism, however, was a procedural
rule, enforced by a point of order, against any budget resolution that
contained tax expenditures exceeding thirty percent of the recommended
level for net revenue set forth in the resolution. Congress could thus easily
evade the rule due to its procedural status.
One could imagine, however, this budget constraint, or something similar,
embedded within the substantive statute. For instance, the prior year’s
revenues could dictate the total level of tax expenditures available to
taxpayers. If revenue benchmarks are met, then the tax expenditures could be
automatically granted in whole.
In the Social Security context, David Kamin has suggested that beneﬁts
and taxes be automatically adjusted if the system is projected to become
insolvent.250 On the tax side, for instance, the payroll tax rates could be
249
250

Tax Expenditure Limitation and Control Act of 1981, S. 193, 97th Cong.
Kamin, supra note 11, at 32.
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automatically increased (or decreased if the projections improve). On the
spending side, beneﬁts could be automatically reduced, perhaps hitting only
new beneﬁciaries or those with higher lifetime earnings. To develop this
further, it is also possible that the spending and tax changes be tied to one
another. For instance, suppose lawmakers are committed to solvency but can
tolerate only so much in beneﬁt cuts. The tax increases could be structured
such that they make up any shortfall in the system’s solvency after taking into
account the savings produced by the beneﬁt cuts.
On a more ambitious level, David Scott Louk and David Gamage have
argued that default budget policies, which are triggered if legislators do not
pass a budget, could cure the games of chicken and negotiating failures that
have come to deﬁne the “new ﬁscal politics.”251 A default budget at the federal
level could be implemented, they suggest, by updating the prior year’s budget
to reﬂect changes in population and the economy, assigning an agency the
task of adjusting taxes and spending based on predetermined formulas.252
b. “Reverse Earmarking”
Some states have experimented with tying revenues to budgetary
constraints. At the federal level and in most states, the gas tax is calculated
on a per unit (typically gallon) basis, not as a percentage of purchase price.
As a result, gas tax revenues do not increase as gasoline prices rise. Indeed,
in the current era, increasing fuel eﬃciency and inﬂation have devastated
revenues from the gas tax, both at the federal and state levels. In response,
some states have begun indexing the gas tax rate to inﬂation or to a percentage
of the price of gas.253 In a more unorthodox move, Nebraska adjusts the gas
tax to the state’s transportation spending in an attempt to ensure adequate
revenues for transportation projects.254 Nebraska’s gas tax is analogous to the
practice of earmarking, which dedicates revenues to a speciﬁc purpose, but
diﬀers in important respects. Earmarking is pursued in order to guarantee
steady sources of funding for the program at issue, but it is criticized for
reducing the legislature’s ﬂexibility in establishing funding priorities.255 A tax
like the Nebraska gas tax—let’s call it “reverse earmarking”—allows the
government to ﬁrst ascertain its spending priorities in certain areas and then
251 David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default
Rules for Budgets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 182, 185-86 (2015).
252 Id. at 246-47.
253 RICHARD C. AUXIER, REFORMING STATE GAS TAXES: HOW STATES ARE (AND ARE
NOT) ADDRESSING AN ERODING TAX BASE 9 (2014), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/
files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/413286-Reforming-State-Gas-Taxes.PDF [https://perma.cc/HVM8-9NFX].
254 Id.
255 For a positive defense of earmarking, see generally Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The
Potential Benefits, 4 PITT. TAX. REV. 55 (2006).
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adjust the tax accordingly to fund those priorities. This type of mechanism
could ensure funding of speciﬁc government activities without forcing the
government’s hand as to spending levels ex ante.
States have also capped tax rates to maintain a static amount of revenue
from year to year. This is done at the property tax level in response to concerns
that local governments were receiving extra revenues as property values
increased.256 These automatically adjusting rates generate the same amount of
revenues from year to year even though the value of the tax base has changed.
Reverse earmarking is essentially a less libertarian version of this mechanism,
instead adjusting tax rates based on current government spending.
c. Tax “Triggers” and Responsible Tax Cutting
States have also recently experimented with so called tax “triggers,”
which phase in tax cuts or other tax reform measures when the state meets
pre-established fiscal targets, such as growth in revenues.257 The triggers are
justified on the basis of promoting fiscal responsibility, although the states’
experiences on this front have been mixed. For instance, in 2014, Oklahoma
tied tax cuts to estimated revenues as opposed to actual revenues, causing
tax cuts to be triggered even though the state’s deficits were rapidly
increasing.258 The legislature was then forced to repeal the trigger so that a
second round of tax cuts did not go into effect.259 In contrast, in 2014 the
District of Columbia enacted tax cuts that were triggered when actual,
realized revenue exceeded budgeted revenue. Revenues, in fact, increased,
and the tax cuts went into effect in 2018.260
Triggers have the potential to allow governments some degree of
predictability in their revenue stream while also letting an increase in
revenues be designated for tax relief,261 allowing for a phenomenon that we
might call “responsible tax cutting.” Triggers could also assist in achieving
consensus over broader tax reform. For instance, if agreement cannot be
reached over appropriate revenue oﬀsets for tax cuts, the cuts might be

Gamage, supra note 222, at 802-04.
Richard C. Auxier, A Tale of Two Tax Triggers, TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 17, 2017),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/tale-two-tax-triggers [https://perma.cc/S9XU-2UUD].
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. Some legislators have argued in favor of delaying the cuts and spending the additional
revenue on education. Peter Jamison, D.C. Council is Urged to Consider Delaying Landmark Tax Cuts,
WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-council-toconsider-delays-to-landmark-tax-cuts/2017/04/27/24c14390-2af6-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html
[https://perma.cc/894V-7SFZ].
261 Jared Walczak, Designing Tax Triggers: Lessons from the States, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/designing-tax-triggers-lessons-states [https://perma.cc/8YCL-VKNN].
256
257
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delayed until revenue goals are attained.262 Experience with the triggers,
however, underscores that they must be carefully designed—a lesson that can
be extended to all dynamic legislation. In addition to accounting for actual
revenues, triggers should account for actual revenue growth rather than the
eﬀects of inﬂation or a temporary rebound in revenues.263 They should, for
instance, be based on multi-year estimates of revenues and spending.264
During the 2017 debate over tax reform, revenue triggers were explored.
Senate deficit hawks proposed to roll back the tax cuts in TCJA if the law’s
deficit impact turned out to be worse than advertised.265 It is important,
however, that any such triggers not be used in a symbolic fashion to justify
unaffordable tax cuts.
Collectively, these examples show that states, as laboratories of
democracy,266 have already begun experimenting with dynamic legislation in
the budgeting context. The federal government can beneﬁt from their
experiences. Indeed, recent federal tax proposals seem to suggest that
automatically adjusting budget-related measures are spreading to the national
arena, although caution should be exercised in their design.267

262 Indeed, the District of Columbia’s triggers came about as part of a large tax reform package
when the D.C. Council did not adopt all of the proposed revenue oﬀsets. Auxier, supra note 257.
263 See Walczak, supra note 261.
264 See MICHAEL MAZEROV & MARLANA WALLACE, REVENUE ‘TRIGGERS’ FOR STATE
TAX CUTS PROVIDE ILLUSION OF FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY 1 (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/atoms/ﬁles/2-6-17sfp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7Q6-UFZ5] (arguing that without the
information gathered from such estimates “policymakers cannot responsibly evaluate the tax cuts’
impact on state services”). Particular care should also be taken so that the trigger mechanism does
not become an antistimulus measure during an economic downturn, though all static tax rates pose
this danger. Walczak, supra note 261.
265 The Senate Parliamentarian scuttled this plan, ruling that the trigger did not meet Byrd
Rule requirements because it did not have a budgetary impact. Pramuk, supra note 13. In one version
of the tax bill, certain delayed tax increases were repealed if revenues turned out to be higher than
expected. Problematically, this “reverse trigger” was designed such that the tax increases could be
turned oﬀ even if revenues were well below the level “to avoid unsustainable deﬁcits or even fully
make up for this legislation’s tax cut up until that point.” David Kamin, The Senate’s Revenue-Trigger
Giveaway to Businesses, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2017), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/thesenates-revenue-trigger-giveaway-to-businesses-97b73a624ec1 [https://perma.cc/B4Y3-KLZU]. In
general, reverse triggers may exacerbate the tendency for lawmakers to engage in short-termism in
ﬁscal planning. This could be combated by ensuring that tax increases also take eﬀect if there are
revenue shortfalls (by employing traditional triggers). Additionally, this experience cautions that
correctly setting the trigger level of revenues is essential.
266 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.”).
267 One could ask why dynamic legislation is underutilized if it has the benefits I contend
exist. These examples, however, show governments are beginning to experiment with this
category of legislation.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, this Article has argued that, along democratic axes, dynamic
legislation categorically outperforms other devices—such as reconciliation,
sequestration, and sunsets—that Congress uses to temper the status quo bias
in American lawmaking. Dynamic legislation allows Congress to retain some
control over policy by avoiding or narrowing delegation to agencies, without
expending resources on frequently updating the law. Dynamic legislation
frees later congresses to eﬀectuate their agenda, rather than to simply race
against changing environs to keep original legislative bargains in place.
Dynamic legislation also has the potential to function like a veil of ignorance
rule—bestowing beneﬁts and burdens upon unknown constituencies—and
thus reduces interest group activity. Finally, by removing the need for future
congressional actions, dynamic legislation reduces opportunities for
budgetary gamesmanship. Dynamic legislation may even improve upon the
budget process by statutorily pegging policy to revenue goals.
As a result of these beneﬁts, Congress should make more frequent and
creative use of dynamic legislation, especially in areas of law that present
democratic concerns and where the availability of quantitative measures
reduces design costs, such as ﬁscal policy. Although our laws will never
entirely be on autopilot, dynamic legislation equips Congress with a tool to
better maintain its legislative intent across time.

